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My dissertation comprises three chapters. The first chapter examines the impacts
of the U.S. shale boom on local patents. The second chapter assesses how more com-
petitive political competitions in Sub-Saharan African countries and positive birth-
year rainfall shocks affect child mortality rates. The third chapter explores the effects
of access and adoption of broadband on self-employment and work-from-home.
The first chapter examines the impacts of the U.S. shale boom on local patenting
at a commuting zone level. I expect that the shale boom will negatively affect patents
because shale development may crowd out labor and capital investments in other non-
energy industries. My findings show that a one standard deviation increase in non-
vertical drilling well density decreases patent intensity by 3.6% of the mean. Areas
with higher drilling densities have lower levels of patented innovation compared to
their counterfactuals. This study contributes to the existing literature related to the
“natural resource curse.” I provide new evidence based on local patenting, which is
an important indicator for regional innovation and long-term economic growth.
In the second chapter, I empirically test three hypotheses that affect child mortality
based on the rural sample in Sub-Saharan African countries. In the first hypothesis,
I assess the effects of more competitive presidential elections on child mortality. In
the second hypothesis, I investigate the impacts of birth year rainfall shocks on child
mortality. In the third hypothesis, I argue the effects of political competition can be
heterogeneous due to different environment conditions. So I interact the presiden-
tial election variable with the rainfall variable to examine the heterogeneous effects
when there are good rainfall shocks during a more competitive presidential election
period. The results show that both competitive elections and positive rainfall shocks
reduce child mortality. Their interaction indicates positive rainfall shocks may be less
effective to reduce child mortality during a more competitive election time period.
In the third chapter, using the American Community Survey and the Federal Com-
munications Commission data, I examine how broadband affects self-employment and
work-from-home for married women. Based on different sources of internet variables,
I investigate the impacts of internet from both the adoption and access to broadband.
I find that adoption and access to high-speed broadband have significantly positive
impacts on self-employment and work-from-home. This study contributes to the
existing literature that examines how Information and Communications Technology
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CHAPTER I
THE IMPACTS OF THE SHALE BOOM ON LOCAL PATENTING: A
NATIONAL STUDY
1. Introduction
Innovation is a vital factor for long-term economic growth (Verspagen, 2005; Gorod-
nichenko and Roland, 2011). This effect is not only aggregated at the country level
but can also be localized at the regional level. For example, using spatial data in
Mexico, Torres-Preciado et al. (2014) establish that technological innovation has a
positive effect on Mexico’s regional economic growth. Of the several innovation in-
dicators, the use of granted patents has been widely supported in previous literature
(Acs et al., 2002; Hall et al., 1984; Jaffe, 1986). Determinants of patenting are various,
and they include the level of research and development (R&D) expenditure, the stock
of human capital inputs, sector activities, and the size of firms (Simonen and McCann,
2008). In most cases, these factors are endogenously determined. For instance, firms
that hire additional high-skilled workers are more likely to have more patents granted,
but it is hard to precisely estimate the effects of additional high-skilled workers on
patents, since the hiring process is correlated with many unobserved factors (e.g.,
firm atmosphere), which are endogenous. Although exogenous shocks are rare, they
provide opportunities to make a more reliable causal inference. The U.S. shale boom
starting from the early 2000s has created relatively exogenous shocks that have been
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widely used as quasi-experimental designs (Brown, 2018). This study examines the
impacts of the U.S. shale boom on local patenting at a commuting zone (CZ) level.
The unprecedented shale boom in the U.S. since the early 2000s has been well assessed
in previous works. With the advancement of fracking technology, firms can extract oil
and gas trapped in deep shale rocks more efficiently, while minimizing environmental
impacts compared to conventional drilling techniques. From 2004, the beginning of the
shale boom, to 2014, wherein oil prices dropped significantly, both oil and gas production
increased more than four times in the U.S. (Feyrer et al., 2017). On the one hand, previous
research works have demonstrated the positive effects of the shale boom on population,
employment, wages, and local economic growth.1 On the other hand, several side effects
have been accompanied the shale boom. For example, environmental issues, such as
water and noise pollution, increase in drilling-intensive areas, while some studies have
established that crime rates increase in places with more drilling activities (James and
Smith, 2017; Komarek, 2018; Rozell and Reaven, 2012).
I expect that the shale boom will negatively affect local patenting. This expectation
is related to the “natural resource curse,” which implies that countries or areas with rich
natural resources have lower economic growth (Van der Ploeg, 2011). Specifically, I dis-
cuss several possible mechanisms whereby shale development may negatively affect local
patenting. First, the shale boom decreased local college attainment, which could result
in a lower level of patenting (Black et al., 2005; Kumar, 2017; Rickman et al., 2017). Sec-
ond, the shale boom reduced the number of entrepreneurs and business start-ups, thereby
lowering patent applications from these potential newly established businesses (Partridge
et al., 2019). Third, the high pay in the oil and gas industry altered the composition of
workers across different industries, possibly decreasing the share of innovative workers
in shale-rich areas. Fourth, a substantial amount of capital was invested in the oil and
1For examples, Weber (2012) finds a large increase in gas production causes modest increases in employment, wages, and
median household income in Colorado, Texas, and Wyoming. Paredes et al. (2015) find robustly significant employment
effect but less significant income effect in Marcellus region. Munasib and Rickman (2015) study net economic impacts of
oil and gas production from shale formations in Arkansas, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania, and conclude that large and
statistically significant positive effects exist in oil and gas counties across wide range of regional labor market measures.
Maniloff and Mastromonaco (2017) find over 500,000 local jobs are attributable to the shale boom in the U.S.
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gas industry, thus crowding out capital investment in other more innovative industries
(Gilje et al., 2020; Popp et al., 2020). Finally, the shale boom was detrimental to local
amenities, including air quality. Therefore, shale-rich areas may become less attractive
to high-skilled workers or decrease workers’ productivity, consequently lowering patented
innovation (Zhang and Chung, 2020).
My findings show that a one standard deviation increase in non-vertical drilling well
density decreases patent intensity by 3.6% of the mean. This suggests that areas with
more drilling activities have lower levels of patented innovation compared to their counter-
factuals. I also empirically assess the mechanisms using evidence from the labor market,
and I find that the share of creative classes decreases in shale-rich areas.
This paper contributes to the broad spectrum of literature related to the “natural
resource curse.” To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that examines the
effects of the U.S. shale boom on local patenting, which is an important indicator of
regional innovation and long-term economic growth. Specifically, this paper answers an
important question: “Did the shale boom enlarge the innovation gap between shale-rich
areas and shale-infeasible areas in the U.S.?” The empirical evidence showed that before
the shale boom, shale-rich areas had less patenting compared to shale-infeasible areas,
and the shale boom widened the gap. This implies that the shale-rich areas embraced
the boon of the shale boom in the short run, but in the long term, it may have hampered
innovation-induced economic growth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The basic conceptual framework
as well as relevant literature are presented in Section 2, while the data sources and main
analytical sample are explained in Section 3. The empirical methods and models to
address the research question are discussed in Section 4, while the empirical results with
explanations are presented in Section 5. Lastly, the summary and concluding remarks
are provided in Section 6.
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2. Conceptual Framework
2.1. Background of Fracking Technology and the Shale Boom
The recent shale boom is associated with technological advancements in fracking (hy-
draulic fracturing). For a long time, scientists have known that a substantial amount of
oil and gas is trapped within deep shale rocks in shale formations. With the expansion
and advancement of fracking techniques, trapped oil and gas in deep shale rocks can be
safely and efficiently extracted and produced. Drilling wells constructed using advanced
fracking technologies are referred to as non-vertical drilling wells. Before the advance-
ment of fracking technology, most drilling wells built were vertical. Understanding the
differences between non-vertical and vertical drilling wells is crucial for the empirical
designs presented herein.2 The initial steps involved in constructing non-vertical and
vertical drilling wells are similar; a hole is drilled straight down through the fresh water
aquifer to a targeted area. However, subsequently the construction processes for vertical
and non-vertical wells differ. For vertical drilling wells, only a simple zone of interest,
which is limited to a certain spherical area, is available to do a single stage fracking job
to produce oil and gas. For non-vertical drilling wells, the pipeline is horizontally or
directionally extended, and multiple stages of fracking jobs are available to produce oil
and gas. The unique design of non-vertical wells is more efficient and may minimize the
environmental impacts compared to vertical drilling wells. The oil and gas production of
one non-vertical drilling well can be compared to that of several vertical drilling wells.
However, although non-vertical wells are more lucrative in the long run, they are much
more expensive to construct than conventional vertical wells (Bartik et al., 2019). There-
fore, building non-vertical wells involves more intense labor and/or capital investments.
As noted in Fitzgerald (2012), the average cost of building non-vertical drilling wells is
approximately three times higher than that of vertical drilling wells. For instance, in the
Woodford Shale, the shift from vertical to non-vertical wells increased the average well
2Non-vertical drilling wells are also known as unconventional drilling wells. Vertical drilling wells are also called
conventional drilling wells.
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cost from US$2 million to US$5–6 million (Bartik et al., 2019; Fitzgerald, 2012).
2.2. Shale Boom and Resource Curses
Summarily, the resource curse refers to the fact that countries with rich natural resources
may have lower economic growth (Van der Ploeg, 2011; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke,
2010; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). For example, “oil revenues per capita in Nigeria
increased from US$33 in 1966 to US$325 in 2000, but income per capita has stagnated at
approximately US$1000 in purchasing power parity terms since its independence in 1960
(Van der Ploeg, 2011)”. The resource curse also occurs at a disaggregated level within
a country. For example, crime rates increase in shale-rich areas due to factors, such as
higher income inequality (James and Smith, 2017; Komarek, 2018; Shakya, 2019). Using
data from Pennsylvania, previous works have established that nearby shale development
has a high negative impact on housing values (Muehlenbachs et al., 2015). The likelihood
of water contamination increases from natural gas extraction in shale-rich areas (Rozell
and Reaven, 2012). Herein, I provide new evidence on the resource curse from another
perspective—the shale boom and local patenting. There are two papers that can elucidate
the hypothesis of this paper, and using cross-country data, the authors find that the shale
boom decreases clean energy patenting (Acemoglu et al., 2019; Popp et al., 2020). My
paper provides evidence at the regional level in the U.S. and focuses on overall patents.
My hypothesis is that for regions with more shale development, labor and capital are
more concentrated in the oil sector, thereby resulting in the lower investment of labor and
capital in other sectors. The crowding-out effects of labor and capital in other sectors are
reflected in the lower level of patenting in shale-rich areas. I provide descriptive evidence
in Section 2.4.
2.3. Innovation and Patenting
The main determinants of patenting include the level of R&D expenditure, the stock of
human capital inputs, sector activities, and the size of the firms (Simonen and McCann,
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2008; Pfister et al., 2021; Agrawal et al., 2010; Xiao et al., 2021). All of these determinants
may be affected during the shale boom. Carlino and Kerr (2014) report that although
invention is a vital indicator of innovation, invention is not equal to innovation. The first
stage of innovation is invention, and patents have been widely used to measure invention.
Subsequent investment is needed to nourish invention into innovation. Therefore, using
patents to measure innovation is a rather crude method and it has a certain degree of
caveats. For instance, some important innovations may never apply for patents, and the
quality of patents can significantly differ. In this work, I use patents to measure local
innovation while acknowledging that limitations do exist.
2.4. Descriptive Evidence
Figure 1 shows the average new non-vertical and vertical drilling well densities at a CZ
level from 2000–2015. From 2005, the non-vertical well density increased rapidly until
2008 and reduced in 2009 temporarily, whereafter it then increased again until 2014.
However, the vertical drilling well density increased from 2000 until 2008 and thereafter
reduced considerably. Figure 2 presents the mean patents per 100K population (patent
intensity) between 2000 and 2015. Before 2009, patent intensity fluctuated between 12
and 14, and it skyrocketed thereafter from 12 to 19.5 in 2014. The potential crowding-
out effects of the shale boom on patenting are depicted in Figure 3. I define the control
group as CZs in 48 lower U.S. states without any non-vertical wells from 2000–2015. Re-
spectively, other CZs with at least one new non-vertical drilling well are in the treatment
group. It is evident that the CZs in the treatment group have a lower level of patent
intensity across all the years from 2000–2015. Notably, 2005 or thereabouts is perceived
as the onset of the shale boom in the U.S. Before 2005, the mean difference in patents
per 100K population (patent intensity) between the control and treatment groups was
less than two. But this difference has amplified over the years after 2005. In Figure 4,
I plot the differences in the patent intensity between the treatment and control groups
shown in Figure 3. It is more intuitive to observe that the patent intensity between the
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treatment and control groups increases over the years. Figure 3 and 4 may indicate that
shale-rich areas have always had a lower level of patent intensity, and the gap widened
after the shale boom.
2.5. Potential Mechanisms
In this section, I discuss potential mechanisms through which shale development may
crowd out local patenting. The first mechanism entails that the shale boom increases the
opportunity costs of obtaining more education. Hence, local average levels of education
are reduced, which indicates that there are fewer higher educated people to innovate.
This mechanism is widely supported by previous literature (Black et al., 2005; Kumar,
2017; Rickman et al., 2017; Han and Winters, 2020). For instance, a previous study
reported that the Appalachian coal boom in the 1970s reduced high school enrollment
significantly (Black et al., 2005). Furthermore, Kumar (2017) discovered that the oil
boom in the 1970s lowered the college premium, leading to a significant drop in college
enrollment and completion. One work examines the effects of the shale boom on high
school and college attainment in Montana, North Dakota, and West Virginia, and the
authors find that the shale boom significantly reduces high school and college attainment
in all three states (Rickman et al., 2017). For the second mechanism, if the shale boom
decreases the number of entrepreneurs or business start-ups, patenting activities may be
simultaneously reduced. Partridge et al. (2019) find that the formation of new firms as
well as sales initially decrease after exposure to the shale boom.
The third mechanism may be attributed to the high pay in the oil and gas industry
that has altered the composition of workers across different industries, thereby possibly
decreasing the share of innovative workers in shale-rich areas. Using the American Com-
munity Survey (ACS), I find that the shale boom has decreased the share of creative class
workers. I provide more details in Section 5.3. The fourth mechanism involves the capital
market. The advancement of fracking technology during the shale boom has resulted in
the construction of numerous non-vertical drilling wells. Although non-vertical drilling
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wells are more efficient than the vertical ones, they are much more expensive to construct
(Bartik et al., 2019). This may suggest that in shale-rich areas, a substantial amount of
capital is invested in the oil and gas industry, thereby crowding out capital investment
in other more innovative industries (Gilje et al., 2020; Popp et al., 2020). Moreover, the
energy industry is a less innovative industry. Over the past decade, the share of the
average R&D expenditure over net sales revenue across all industries has been between
2.5 and 3.5%; for the manufacturing industry, the share ranges from 3.1 to 3.9%, while
for high-tech industries, such as the computer industry, it has been approximately 10%.
However, for mining and extraction industries, which include the energy sector, the share
has been less than one percent until 2015 (Popp et al., 2020). The last mechanism derives
from the local amenity perspective. Zhang and Chung (2020) find that poor air quality
has been detrimental to regional innovation based on city-level evidence in China. As
has been documented in previous works, the shale boom has had negative effects on lo-
cal housing values and increased local water contamination (Muehlenbachs et al., 2015;
Rozell and Reaven, 2012). The deterioration of local amenities may be less attractive
to high-skilled workers and workers may become less productive, and this may indicate
lower patented innovation.
3. Data
I combine different types of data for the empirical analyses. Herein, the main geographical
unit is at a CZ level. Notably, CZs are clusters of U.S. counties that are characterized
by strong within-cluster and weak between-cluster commuting ties (Autor et al., 2019;
Autor and Dorn, 2013). Using CZ-level data can mitigate spillover effects across counties
(Tolbert and Sizer, 1996). The information on new drilling wells is obtained from Enverus
3. The data reports detail information on new drilling wells, including the coordinates
of each drilling well. I use the coordinates to identify the CZ that each drilling well
belongs to. Enverus also provides information on the types of drilling wells; hence, it
3https://www.enverus.com/
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is possible to distinguish between vertical and non-vertical drilling wells. As discussed
in the conceptual framework section, due to the technological advancement of fracking
techniques during the shale boom, an increasing number of non-vertical drilling wells
have been built after 2004 (Figure 1). Additionally, non-vertical wells are much more
expensive to build (Bartik et al., 2019). I test different treatment variables based on
the non-vertical or vertical drilling well density to observe where the significant negative
effects on local patents originate.
Patent information is obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. I extract
the total utility patents for inventions granted from 2000 to 2015 at the county level,
and thereafter aggregate them to the CZ level. According to the data description, “the
geographic distribution of the patents at the county level is based on the residence, at
grant, of the inventor whose name appears first on the printed patent (i.e., the first-named
inventor).”
The main data for control variables are obtained from the ACS via the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al., 2020). The ACS is an annual survey of
one percent of the U.S. population wherein demographic, education, work, income, and
other information is collected. To comply with the sample period of the patents, I use the
2000–2015 ACS data.4 The smallest identifiable geographic area in the ACS is the Public
Use Microdata Area (PUMA). Based on PUMA to CZ crosswalk files, the variables are
converted to the CZ level.
Another source of control variables is the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW) data. The QCEW data provide industry-specific employment and wages at the
county level. I use these data to control employment outside the mining industry. Again,
the county level variables are aggregated to the CZ level.
Combining all the above-mentioned data sources, the main analytical sample extends
from 2000 to 2015 and contains 705 CZs covering the entire lower 48 U.S. states (excluding
the District of Columbia).
4I use 2000 5% census data and 2001-2015 1% ACS data.
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4. Methods and Models
4.1. Baseline Two-way Fixed Effects Model
The paper examines how new drilling activities affect the patent intensity at a CZ level.
In the baseline specification, I estimate linear regressions in the form provided below for
a CZ c in year t:
Patentct = β0 + β1WellDensityct + γXct + πc + ϕrt + δcTct + µct (1)
As noted in the data section, I choose CZs as the analytical units because they are
clusters of counties with strong within-cluster and weak across-cluster commuting ties
(Autor et al., 2019; Autor and Dorn, 2013). Using CZs can mitigate spillover effects
across counties (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996). Because CZs vary according to the population
and land area sizes, directly comparing the total patents across CZs is undesirable. It is
very likely that larger CZs have higher patenting activities simply due to their larger pop-
ulations. Thus, the dependent variable is defined as patent intensity, which is measured
as the number of total patents per 100K population 5. The main explanatory variable of
interest—WellDensityct—is defined as the new non-vertical well density. I calculate the
variable as the number of new non-vertical wells divided by the land area in 1000 square
miles in a CZ c. Xct is a set of time-variant control variables, including demographic,
education, and non-mining industry employment variables. Details of the construction of
Xct are reported in Appendix. I also include CZ fixed effects πc and region-by-year fixed
effects ϕrt to absorb time-invariant heterogeneities across CZs and shocks to different
regions in each sample year.6 In addition, I include δcTct to capture a CZ-specific linear
time trend.
5Population refers all population not only working age population. To account for endogenous population growth, I use
year 2000 population to generate the patent intensity variable for all the years. For example, year 2001 patent intensity in
CZ code 100 is year 2001 patents divided by 100K population in year 2000.
6The four US Census regions are the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.
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4.2. Interactive Fixed Effects Model
In Section 4.1, I control for a linear time trend in addition to the two-way fixed effects
baseline model. I also include a test for a quadratic time trend (see footnote 9). However,
the actual time trend may neither be linear nor quadratic; it can be in other forms, which
are not fully observable. As depicted in Figure 2, there is no apparent trend for patent
intensity prior to 2008, but there is a sizeable upward trend after 2008. The overall trend
for full sample years from 2000–2015 may be perceived as a quadratic trend. This elicits
one of the challenges of the baseline model — time-varying unobserved heterogeneities.
To address this, I employ the interactive fixed effects (IFE) approach in addition to the
two-way fixed effects model to enable a flexible and explicit modeling of the non-linear
time-varying heterogeneities, as shown in Equation 2 below (Bai, 2009; Czarnowske and
Stammann, 2020; Kejriwal et al., 2018; Totty, 2017):
Patentct = β0 + β1WellDensityct + γXct + πc + ϕrt + λscFst + µct (2)
Compared to Equation 1, the linear time trend term δcTct is dropped in Equation 2, while
it includes an additional term λscFst to model the IFE. The IFE model assumes that the
dependent variable patent intensity can be modeled as a function of s unobserved linear
factors, Fst, which are common across all CZs c in year t. Furthermore, λsc represents
the CZ-specific factor loadings, which are constant over year t. These factors can be
considered as omitted variables, including λscFst, which allow the unobserved common
factors to be correlated with the regressors (Bai, 2009; Totty, 2017). To understand
this, assume that there is a national policy change which encourages patenting by giving
monetary rewards. The effects of the policy may be heterogeneous across CZs depending
on CZ-specific characteristics. For example, CZs with higher shares of older populations
may be less motivated by this national policy because older people may be richer; thus,
they are less attracted by the monetary rewards.
Finally, as noted in the second paragraph on page 1716 in Totty (2017), “the IFE
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model will produce similar estimates as the ordinary least squares model if the two-way
fixed effects specification is correct.” I compare different estimates in the subsequent
sections, and I implement the IFE model using the Stata “regife” command developed
by Gomez (2017).
4.3. Border Contiguity
I utilize the two-way fixed effects model and the IFE model described in the previous
sections to address the unobserved time-varying heterogeneity. However, using the full
U.S. sample to compare shale-rich CZs with shale-infeasible CZs may not be ideal as it
may not be a comparable control group. To facilitate a more appropriate comparison, I
choose control CZs based on spatial contiguity (Dube et al., 2010). Rather than compar-
ing the patent intensity of all the shale-rich CZs to CZs without any non-vertical drilling
wells, I compare the patent intensity of all the shale-rich CZs to their contiguous CZs
without any non-vertical drilling wells.
4.4. First-Difference Model
Although using CZs as an analytical unit can help to control spillover effects across
counties, there may still exist year-variant spillover effects across CZs that possibly con-
taminate the main specification. Because patenting is highly human capital intensive,
proximity to large metropolitan areas can induce more patenting. This effect may change
over time. To account and quantify the year-variant spillovers, I control for urban hier-
archy variables, which are incrementally distant to the nearest metropolitan statistical
area (MSA) with a population of at least 250K, 500K, 1500K, and 2000K (Partridge
et al., 2008). However, the baseline two-way fixed effects model in Equation 1 absorbs
all the time-invariant variables, including incremental distance controls. Alternatively, I
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estimate a first-difference model in Equation 3, as follows7:
∆Patentct = β0 +β1∆WellDensityct+γ∆Xct+ξIncDisc+θPatent
90−99
c +ϕrt+µct (3)
where ∆Patentct = Patentct - Patentct−n;
∆WellDensityct = WellDensityct - WellDensityct−n;
∆Xct = Xct - Xct−n; subscript c refers to a CZ, t is a year with n = 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5,
which indicates the period of time differences used for each model; IncDisc represents
the incremental distance to the nearest MSA with a population of at least 250K, 500K,
1500K, and 2000K; while Patent90−99c refers to the average patent intensity between 1990
and 1999. This term captures the time-variant effect of initial patenting for each CZ.
For example, CZs with more patenting between 1990 and 1999 may have high patenting
growth rates in subsequent years.
4.5. Instrumental Variables
To alleviate endogeneity issues due to the fact that drilling activities are not randomly
assigned to different CZs across the U.S., I use instrumental variables (IVs) based on
historical geological formation for shale plays. The IV incorporates time-invariant geo-
logical and temporal information for a given CZ (Feyrer et al., 2017). I construct this IV
using two steps in Equations 4 and 5 below. I first estimate:
Ln(Wellct + 1) = αc + λjt + εct (4)
where Wellct represents the number of non-vertical drilling wells for CZ c and year t, αc
represents a dummy of each CZ, and λjt represents a set of dummy variables for shale
play-year combination.8
7Fix effects and first-difference are similar but each has its own merits. One of the benefits using a first-difference is it
allows regressions to include time-invariant control variables (Wooldridge, 2010).
8According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “shale play is a set of discovered, undiscovered or
possible natural gas accumulations that exhibit similar geological characteristics. Shale plays are located within basins”.
There are around 20 shale plays in the U.S.
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In the second step, I generate predicted wells density as follows:
̂WellDensityct = (eα̂c+λ̂jt − 1)/TotalAreac (5)
Where TotalAreac is the total land area in 1000 square miles for a CZ c. This IV
uses α̂c + λ̂jt, which contains geological formations in a given CZ and shale play-year
information, to predict new non-vertical drilling well densities. These predicted values
for new non-vertical drilling well densities are based on the timing of new drilling wells
for all the CZs within a particular shale play. As a CZ represents a small part of the
shale play’s drilling wells’ construction, the instrument is exogenous with respect to the
idiosyncratic roll out of fracking within individual CZs (Feyrer et al., 2017).
5. Results
5.1. Main Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables. The construction of control
variables is reported in Appendix. The mean CZ-level patenting per 100K population
(patent intensity) over the full sample period is 14.66. The means of non-vertical and
vertical wells per 1,000 square miles are 3.31 and 8.92, respectively. Figure 5 shows
the distribution maps of the mean non-vertical drilling well densities for full sample
years between 2000 and 2015. Drilling wells are concentrated in energy states, including
Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the mean patent
intensity, wherefrom it is indicated that energy states have lower levels of patent intensity.
Table 2 Panel A presents the baseline regression results obtained from Equation 1
along with the IFE described in Section 4.2 for the full sample. In Table 2 Panel B,
the sample CZs are restricted based on the border contiguity discussed in Section 4.3.
Columns (1) and (2) present the baseline regression results, and column (3) presents the
IFE results estimated using Equation 2. In Panel A, column (1) indicates that a one
unit increase in non-vertical drilling well density decreases patent intensity by 0.0294,
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which means that a one standard deviation increase in drilling well density decreases the
patent intensity by 3.6% of the mean. In column (2), I include a linear time trend to
serve as a control for the linear growth in patent intensity over years, and it reveals that
a one unit increase in non-vertical well density decreases the patent intensity by 0.0286,
which is similar to column (1).9 In column (3), the IFE is incorporated to explicitly
estimate and control the time trend. It shows that an increase in non-vertical drilling
well density reduces patent intensity, though the magnitude (0.0221) is a little less than
those in columns (1) and (2). Table 2 Panel A indicates that areas with more drilling
activities measured by the non-vertical drilling well density have lower levels of patent
intensity compared to other areas without non-vertical drilling wells. As noted in Section
4.3, directly comparing drilling-rich areas with all other areas without any drilling may
not be ideal. I narrow down the control group CZs based on the border contiguity in
Table 2 Panel B.
Table 2 Panel B replicates Panel A regressions using border contiguity CZs as the
estimation sample. Specifically, the sample contains CZs with at least one non-vertical
drilling well between 2000 and 2015 and their border CZs. All other CZs are excluded in
the sample. In Panel B, column (1) shows that a one unit increase in the non-vertical well
density decreases the patent intensity by 0.0306. This is very similar to that in column
(1) in Panel A, but with a marginally higher magnitude. Columns (2) and (3) in Panel B
are similar to Panel A. Because restricting sample CZs based on border contiguity does
not qualitatively change the results, I use the full sample, including all the CZs, in the
subsequent tables unless otherwise noted.
In Table 3, I present an estimation of the first-difference regressions in Equation
3. Using first differencing can remove time-invariant factors that may contaminate the
estimates, and it serves a similar function as CZ fixed effects. The benefit of using
first differencing compared to fixed effects is that the latter provides researchers with
the flexibility to include time-invariant control variables. Consequently, I can observe
9Instead of including a linear time trend, I test including a quadratic time trend. Results are similar to Panel A, both
column (1) and (2).
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whether the time-invariable attributes of interest have any effects over time. I include
urban hierarchy incremental distance controls and average patent intensity between 1990
and 1999 (Partridge et al., 2008). As I discussed in the previous sections, CZs are clusters
of counties with strong within-cluster ties and weak across-cluster ties. Using CZs can
mitigate spillover effects across counties; however, some spillovers may still exist from the
nearby large MSAs, and the spillovers may change over years. For example, CZs near the
largest New York–Newark–Jersey City metropolitan area may receive strong spillovers,
which may increase over years as this metropolitan area further grows. By including the
average patent intensity between 1990 and 1999, the initial levels of patent intensity can
be captured to observe how the effects of the initial levels of patent intensity evolved
over the years. I use different time periods for first differencing from one year to five
years in columns (1) to (5). Therefore, I can capture whether the crowding-out effects in
drilling-rich areas amplify or shrink from the short-term (1-year) to the median-term (5-
year). In column (1), one unit change in the non-vertical drilling well density reduces the
change in patent intensity by 0.022. These crowding-out effects increase over years and
arrive at the peak in the 4-year difference, wherein one unit change in non-vertical drilling
well density reduces the change in patent intensity by 0.034. This is approximately 50%
larger than the 1-year difference. In addition, from the incremental distances to MSA
controls, I observe that CZs have a lower patent intensity when they are located away
from MSAs with at least populations of 500K and 1500K. This is consistent with urban
hierarchy models (Partridge et al., 2008). Specifically, it indicates that CZs near large
MSAs receive positive spillover effects for higher patent intensity growth. Finally, the
significant positive coefficients from the average patent intensity between 1990 and 1999
reveals that the higher initial level of patent intensity in the foregoing time period can
predict higher patenting in subsequent years.
The results using IVs are presented in Table 4. First stage results are shown in Panel
A. Both the first stage results presented in column (1) and (2) have expected positive
signs and exceed conventional values to identify the weak instrument. In column (1)
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Panel B, one unit increase in non-vertical well density reduces the patent intensity by
0.022. Incorporating a CZ linear trend gives a similar estimate in column (2). One unit
increase in the new drilling well density is associated with a 0.025 decrease in patent
intensity.
5.2. Robustness Checks
I conduct several robustness checks, as presented in the Tables in the Appendix. Table
A1 reports the lagging effects of the non-vertical well density. In Panel A, I test the main
treatment variables separately, and it shows that there are significant crowding-out effects
of building new non-vertical drilling wells up to a two-year lag. The strongest effects are
the contemporaneous ones. In Panel A, I control the contemporaneous and lagging
effects separately because the construction of new drilling wells for continuous years may
be highly correlated, and controlling them together may trigger perfectly collinear issues.
The results reported in Panel B include the simultaneous contemporaneous and lagging
effects of new drilling wells. All columns in Panel B provide evidence that the crowding-
out effects of new drilling wells on patent intensity are the strongest contemporaneously.
In Table A2, I test the main results restricting the sub-sample. Panel A column (1)
replicates the baseline two-way fixed effects in column (1) Panel A of Table 2. In Panel A
column (2), I exclude the top one percent CZs with the highest new drilling well density.
It shows that a unit increase in the new drilling well density is associated with a 0.039
unit decrease in patent intensity. Similarly, column (1) in Panel B excludes the top one
percent CZs with the highest patent intensity. Panel B column (2) excludes the top
one percent CZs with the highest new drilling well density and patent intensity. The
main results still hold. New York became the first state to ban fracking around 2014;
thus, I excluded all CZs in New York in Panel C column (1). Although fracking is not
completely banned in California, drilling activities are strictly regulated. Furthermore,
California as a state with many technology centers, such as Silicon Valley, may dominate
patenting activities. In Panel C column (2), I exclude CZs in California. In Panel D
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column (1), I exclude all CZs in New York or California. All these exclusions do not alter
the main results qualitatively. Finally, from Figure 3, I notice that the difference in the
mean patent intensity in the control and treatment CZs diverged in a larger magnitude
after 2011. In Panel D column (2), I estimate Equation (1) using the 2000–2010 sample
only. The estimates are close to the main baseline results in Panel A column (1) with
a marginally smaller size. This means that the crowding-out effects are not only due to
the most recent years from 2011 to 2015 but start in the early period of the shale boom.
In Table A3, I estimate Equation (1) for the MSA sample CZs in Panel A and for non-
MSA sample CZs in Panel B. The crowding-out effects on patent intensity are stronger
in the MSA sample but are still sizeable in the non-MSA sample. Notably, CZs with
MSAs have more innovative activities and they may be more affected during the shale
boom.
The technological innovation during the shale boom increased the number of new
non-vertical drilling wells radically. Meanwhile, conventional vertical wells were still
constructed over years especially in the early shale boom years (Figure 1). In Table A4, I
estimate Equation (1) using the new vertical drilling well density as the main treatment
variable. Vertical drilling well density is calculated as the number of new vertical drilling
wells divided by the total land area in 1000 square miles. No significant crowding-out
effects are observed in any columns in Table A4. Compared to Table 2, using new non-
vertical wells, the insignificant effects in Table A4 suggest that the crowding-out effects
ensue from building non-vertical wells rather than vertical ones. This helps to confirm the
hypothesis—building non-vertical wells costs more resources, including labor and capital.
Therefore, the allocation of resources in other industries is crowding out.
5.3. Testing Mechanisms in the Labor Market
I test potential mechanisms from the labor market based on the share of different classes
of workers. Following previous literature, I define the share of workers as the creative,
service, and working classes (Florida et al., 2008; Florida, 2014; Gabe et al., 2013). If
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the share of creative class workers decreases in areas with more drilling activities, it
may indicate that there are fewer innovative people to obtain granted patents. Similar
to Equation 1, I regress the share of different classes of workers on the new non-vertical
drilling well density. The results are presented in Table A5. In column (1), a unit increase
in the non-vertical drilling well density is associated with a 0.0029 (0.29%) decrease in
the share of creative class workers. Column (3) shows that a one unit increase in the
non-vertical drilling well density is associated with a 0.0078 (0.78%) increase in the
share of working-class workers. These results indicate that the share of creative class
workers declines, whereas the share of the working-class workers grew as more drilling
wells are built. The shale boom induced local labor composition changes. However,
share of workers depend on both denominator and numerator. The decrease in the share
of creative class workers may simply reflect an increase in total number of workers and
the number of creative classes may remain unchanged. It is not surprising that share of
working class workers increases in drilling areas because working class consists extraction
and other oil and gas related occupations.
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
The recent U.S. shale boom due to the advancement in fracking technology has been
attracting considerable attention from researchers. In this study, I examine the effects of
the U.S. shale boom on local patenting. I find that a one unit increase in the non-vertical
drilling well density is associated with more than a 0.029 unit decrease in patent per
100K population. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in the non-vertical
drilling well density decreases patent intensity by 3.6% of the mean. The crowding-
out effects do not exist when the vertical drilling well density is used as the treatment
variable.
I provide possible mechanisms thorough which the crowding-out effects exist based on
evidence from human capital, labor, capital market, and local amenity perspectives. I
empirically access the share of creative class workers, and I find that shale development
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reduces the local share of creative classes, though the evidence is not ascertained. I find
that contemporaneous effects are stronger than lagging effects. Some patents can take
up to several years to process, whereas some are processed presumably quicker. Drilling
wells also take time to be built, although this generally takes less than a year.
I admit the limitation that patents are a rather crude measure of innovation, and the
quality of patents can be very different across products. The empirical evidence presented
herein suggests that shale-rich areas had lower levels of patent intensity compared to
shale-infeasible areas before the shale boom, and this gap has widened over years after the
shale boom. This indicates that innovation-related phenomenon was being crowded out
as measured by patents. More research is needed to identify the resources that have been
crowded out, thereby resulting in lower patent intensity; however, this paper provides
evidence on a new channel through which the natural resource curse may be detrimental
to local areas. The development of natural resources reduces local patenting, thereby
suggesting that areas with natural resources have reduced innovation and, consequently,
less long-term economic growth.
As for the policy implications, people should be aware that regional innovation may
be impeded in areas where natural resources are intensively developed. Specifically, shale
resource-rich states, such as Oklahoma and West Virginia, may need more place-based
policies for innovation-related regional economic growth in the long term. Otherwise, the
innovation gap between shale-rich and shale-infeasible areas may grow indefinitely and
never reach economic convergence, that is, poor areas may never catch up with rich areas
(Barro and Sala-i Martin, 1992).
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CHAPTER II
RETURNS TO POLITICAL COMPETITION AND LIVING
CONDITIONS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, RAINFALL, AND
CHILD MORTALITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
1. Introduction
Child mortality in SSA countries is of research interest in many studies. One reason is
that how to reduce the high child mortality in SSA countries is an important question
(see Table 5). Another reason is child mortality can be used as a proxy for economic
well-being and social welfare, examining factors that affect child mortality can provide
information for policy makers to improve economic outcomes. Cutler et al. (2006)
investigate the determinants of child mortality, and they find “the long-term reach
of early-life factors” is one of the determinants of mortality. Therefore, I propose
three hypotheses below to examine how economic shocks affect child mortality in
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.
In the first hypothesis of this paper, I assess empirically the effects of political
competition on economic outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa. I exploit the increased
number of elections in SSA countries since 1990 and the availability of detailed micro
level data to explore the effect of political competition on household welfare. I use
presidential election outcomes in SSA countries between 1990 and 2013. Political
competition is measured by the margin of the elections. I measure economic perfor-
mance by child mortality. I then estimate the effects of the intensity of presidential
election competitiveness on child mortality and I expect more competitive elections
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indicate the president is more likely to be competent, hence lowers child mortality.
There are some published works in which can elucidate the first hypothesis. For example,
Battaglini (2014) shows theoretically that whether increased political competition pro-
duce more efficient resource allocation depends on the electoral rules and the underlying
fundamentals of the economy. Besley et al. (2010) use the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to
associate an increase in political competition in the US Southern states with an improved
economic performance measured by income per capita.
Inspired by Deaton (2007) and Bozzoli et al. (2007), in the second hypothesis, I in-
vestigate the impacts of birth year rainfall shocks on child mortality in Sub-Saharan
Africa countries. I expect that positive rainfall shocks in the birth year improve living
conditions of new-born infants. Therefore, their probability of dying early may decrease.
Specifically, Deaton (2007) and Bozzoli et al. (2007) investigate environmental determi-
nants of height in developing countries. They find high childhood mortality is associated
with taller adults in Africa, which suggests “selection effects” are stronger than “scarring
effects”. This means better birth year living conditions contribute to lower child mor-
tality rates, which implies larger numbers of weaker children survive and they are more
likely to be in lower height.
In the third hypothesis of this paper, I argue the effects of political competition can
be heterogeneous due to different environment conditions. In light of the vast rainfall
literature on both developing and developed countries, I test the third hypothesis using
standard rainfall data covering the entire sample countries and years from the first hy-
pothesis. Specifically, political competition during rich rainfall years may have different
impacts compared to political competition during normal rainfall years. For example,
if a competitive political election is complementary to higher rainfall, I may anticipate
additional decrease in child mortality during rich rainfall years. However, if a competitive
political election is not complementary to higher rainfall years, I may observe statistically
insignificant additional mortality reduction.
The results show that both competitive elections and positive rainfall shocks reduce
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child mortality. Their interaction indicates a positive rainfall shock may be less effective
to reduce child mortality during a more competitive election time. This paper contributes
to the existing literature related to child mortality in SSA countries.
2. Conceptual Framework
2.1. Political Completion and Its Effects
In the earlier works, Stigler (1972) and Wittman (1989) lay out the theoretical back-
ground and argue that increased competition would lead to more efficient governments.
Although the literature on this topic is growing, but due to endogeneity issues, it is a
nascent area that should get increased attention.
Carbone and Pellegata (2017) discuss how multiparty elections in African countries
after 1990s affect welfare policies. They test whether voters exercise their power to push
policy makers to improve their performance and the delivery of social welfare goods. They
examine indicators for welfare investments including health spending, primary school
enrolment rates, and child mortality. They find more competitive elections increase social
welfare. Similarly, Gerring et al. (2015) suggest that electoral democracy contributes
to human development, because politicians are incentivized to enhance social policies.
Harding and Stasavage (2014) pay a special attention to the connections between African
elections and African education. Based on national and individual African data, their
work shows democracies have higher rates of school attendance than non-democracies,
since democracies are more likely to abolish school fees. Wullert and Williamson (2016)
find hybrid regimes in 47 African countries cause higher infant mortality due to factors
such as political instability. Kjelsrud et al. (2020) focus on India and show that a rise in
employment inequality induces more post-neonatal infant deaths, only when the political
competition is weak. Their work informs that a more efficient government is more likely
to issue pro-business policies to mitigate the adverse effects of employment inequality.
In Addition, existing literature point out quality of politicians are capable for competent
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government, consequently economic performance (Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Grofman and
Selb, 2009; Selb, 2009).
Two of the close antecedents to the study are Kudamatsu (2012) and Harding (2020).
Kudamatsu (2012) exploits the transitions from one-party or military regimes to multi-
party systems in the 1990 in Sub-Saharan Africa to test the effects of democratization on
child mortality, and the author finds that shifting to multiparty system in SSA countries
since 1990 drops child mortality significantly. Another study by Harding (2020) use
individual data from 27 African countries. The author finds democratic elections increase
access to primary education and reduce child mortality rates only in rural areas, and
conclude that competitive elections incentivize governments to provide pro-rural policies.
This study is different from their papers in two ways. First, I take advantage of the
detailed elections results over 25 years to precisely measure the competitiveness of over
100 presidential elections as “multi-shocks”. Unlike Kudamatsu (2012), who focuses
on “the one time shock”, defined as the shift from one-party to multi-party systems.
Second, I interact the political competition with rainfall shocks to test whether a more
competitive election may have a stronger or weaker impact on child mortality during the
period with more rainfall.
In light of the existing works, I formulate two main mechanisms whereby political
competition can improve welfare and hence reduce child mortality in SSA countries. In
the first mechanism, a more contested political completion refers to higher democracy
and lower corruption (e.g., one-party vs. multiparty system), which could result in social
welfare improvements. In the second mechanism, a more contested political competition
is accompanied with stronger electoral incentives, which could be reflected as welfare
improvements.
2.2. Rainfall Shocks and Its Effects
Exposure to different shocks at the early age may have short-run and long-run effects
(Baird et al., 2011; Kazianga, 2012). These shocks can be various, including weather
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shocks, income shocks, war shocks, etc. Among weather shocks, the rainfall shock has
been widely accessed in the existing literature. One of the main reasons could be that the
rainfall shock is perceived as an exogenous shock. Therefore, identification of causality is
more convincing even without a rich set of control variables. For example, Maccini and
Yang (2009) investigate the impact of early-life rainfall shocks on health, schooling, and
economic outcomes using Indonesian data. They find higher levels of rainfall at the birth
year has positive effects on health conditions, height, and grades of schooling for women
but no significant effects for men. The positive effects are identified only at the birth
year. One of the mechanisms is higher precipitation increases the agricultural conditions
in Indonesia where rice production is one of the main industries.
Shah and Steinberg (2017) study the factors that affect human capital investment
in India. They find children are more likely switching out of school into productivity
work when exposing to higher rainfall shocks. The opportunity cost of foregone wages
for schooling is high when productivity is high. They drop out the school and take a
lucrative job instead. BenYishay (2013) investigates the impacts of early rainfall on trust
behavior using SSA countries. They show that higher rainfall shocks in the first five years
after birth substantially increase localized trust of one’s relatives and neighbors in adult
life. They also mention rainfall shocks is one of the primary shocks in early childhood
since it is one of the determining factors for agriculture and living conditions.
Another work by Jayachandran (2006) uses rainfall as an instrument for agricultural
productivity because rainfall is exogenous. The author offers an alternative way to con-
struct rainfall variable. In particular, the rainfall shock variable equals one if the annual
rainfall is above the eightieth percentile for the district, zero if it is between the eightieth
and twentieth percentiles, or minus one if it is below the twentieth percentile. In this
study, I prefer to construct rainfall shock variable as suggested by Maccini and Yang
(2009) since this rainfall variable is continuous and more likely to capture the rainfall
variations. Similar to the sample used in the study, Hyland and Russ (2019) examine the
effects of long-term drought in SSA countries, and they find children who were exposed
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to drought in the birth year received lower education and were significantly less wealthy
as adults.
Another strand of literature discusses the consequences of higher rainfall on precipi-
tation abundant areas. For instance, abnormal high levels of rainfall can result in flood,
which have negative effects on social economic outcomes (Carrillo, 2020). The author
investigates the long-term effects of in-utero exposure to abnormal rainfall in Columbia,
and finds in-utero exposure to adverse rainfall shocks leads to poorer long-term adult
outcomes. Specifically, increase in prenatal flood is associated with an increase in mental
disability rates, a decline in years if schooling, an increase in illiteracy rates, and a reduc-
tion in the likelihood of working. In addition, the author finds that the effects on health
and educational outcomes are larger for males than for females. The paper sheds light
on the fact that rainfall shocks can have heterogeneous effects based on different areas.
Carrillo (2020) finds higher rainfall can generate flood in Columbia, which negatively
affects long-term adult outcomes. However, this hardly provides legitimate explanation
for this paper, because most SSA countries are covered by desert and suffered from water
shortage.
Finally, I want to answer whether rainfall shocks affect political competition? If the
answer is true, the interaction design of political competition and rainfall shocks may be
problematic, because now the political competition becomes an outcome variable of rain-
fall shocks. Brückner and Ciccone (2011) can elucidate the answer. Their study is based
on a country level rainfall and democratic institutions data, and show that “negative
rainfall shocks are followed by significant improvements in democratic institutions”. It
is clear that country level rainfall conditions (e.g., drought) have an impact on political
competitions. Thus, I exploit a local rainfall variable which is measured at a DHS cluster
level.10 Because each cluster only represents a small part of the country, it is less likely
that the local rainfall shock will affect country level presidential elections.
10DHS cluster is the smallest geographic area identified in each round of DHS survey. This variable identifies the residence
area when a mother was surveyed.
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3. Data
I use three main data sources that are publicly available for the empirical analyses.
The information on election outcomes is taken from the African Election Database that
archives election outcomes for SSA Countries.11 The information includes presidential
elections, national assemblies’ elections and national referendums, starting from the earli-
est elections until the latest in each country. First round and runoff elections are included
when relevant. I use presidential election outcomes in 23 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) coun-
tries between 1990 and 2013. During the period I consider, the sample countries ran 101
presidential elections involving more than one candidate.
I extract the rainfall data from Global Climate Resources data housed at University
of Delaware.12 This data provides monthly precipitation level at 0.5 degree resolution
satellite imaginary, covering the entire Africa, with more than 100 years data from 1900.
I aggregate the monthly rainfall data to obtain the yearly rainfall data.
I am primarily interested in the effect of political competition on household level
outcomes. I proxy household economic well-being by child mortality, and child and
maternal health care including immunization and births assisted by health professionals.
The demographic and health surveys (DHS) provides measures of these variables that
are consistent across countries and across time.13 I only use the rounds of DHS surveys
that provide GPS coordinates to merge with the nearest rainfall data.
Combining all the data above, the main analytical sample consists 20 SSA countries





4. Methods and Models
To empirically access three hypotheses listed above, I estimate linear regressions in the
forms below:
yimlcat = β0 + β1competca + β2Ximlcat + β3Zmlct + θa + γmlct + εimlcat (6)
The first hypothesis is estimated by equation (6). Child is indexed by i, mother by
m, DHS cluster by l, country by c, birth year by a, and survey year by t. The outcome
variable y describes the mortality status for child i, born to mother m, in country c, in
year a, and who was surveyed in year t. The variable competca measures how strongly
the presidential election was contested in year a, i.e. in the year when the child was born.
I define competca as 100 minus the share of votes of the presidential election winner in
percentage. Intuitively, using this measurement of competca , a lower share of votes of the
presidential winner refers to a more competitive election. Ximlcat and Zmlct represents
child level and mother level observed characteristics, respectively. I include variables
child gender and child birth order. θa is child birth year fixed effects, which is used to
control for birth-specific shocks. γmlct represents mother fixed effects, which can absorb
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneities up to a specific mother Kudamatsu (2012). To
illustrate, let consider two siblings, each born at the beginning of a presidential term of
five years. Sibling A is born when the president is freshly elected with a large margin.
In contrast, sibling B is born when the president is elected with a smaller margin. I am
interested in testing whether sibling B is less likely to die in childhood than sibling A,
as a result of being born in a period of a more competitive presidential mandate. The
central hypothesis is that more contested elections would have induced the president to
promote more effective public policies when sibling B was born (references).
The main identification strategy is based on mother fixed effects. However, because
time-varying country level variables (say δct) are likely to affect child mortality rates
and elections outcomes, OLS estimate of β1 in equation (6) may be biased. For ex-
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ample, improving economic condition over time could both affect child mortality and
political competitiveness. Likewise, increasing literacy rates or a growing middle class
could make elections more contested and reduce child mortality simultaneously. Alterna-
tively, a negative economic shock (especially if badly handled by the sitting government)
could increase child mortality but may influence political outcomes (Baird et al., 2011;
Brückner and Ciccone, 2011). To deal with this issue, I include a rich set of controls to
proxy for time-varying country level variables. I first include two additional variables to
capture runoff and incumbent presidential candidates’ status. I then argue that given the
structure of African economies, annual prices of main exports and imports and time inter-
acted with regional and colonial background fixed effects can control most of the annual
changes in each country. Specifically, I consider the main following main regions: West
Africa, East Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa. Colonial background includes
“French”, “British” and “Spanish”. Additionally, I also include the main agro-climatic
regions (e.g., the Sahel). Each of these regions usually includes several countries and
more than one agro-climatic region could be found in many countries (e.g., Cameroon,
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, etc.). These variables interacted with time trend could control for
most unobserved time-varying effects and still leave enough variations in the competition
variable to be identified. Finally, I also control for annual prices of the main export and
import goods, including oil, aluminum, bananas, cocoa, coffee, cotton, groundnuts, log,
maize, rice, tea and uranium. Controlling for these proxy variables should reduce the
partial correlation between δct and competca and hence the correlation between competca
and εimlcat, which in turn will reduce the bias in the estimate of β1. In main results
section, I compare estimates with different combinations of these covariates to provide
an insight about the bias of the estimates.
yimlcat = β0 + β1rainfallla + β2Ximlcat + β3Zmlct + θa + γmlct + εimlcat (7)
The second hypothesis is estimated by equation (7). Child is indexed by i, mother
by m, DHS cluster by l, country by c, birth year by a, and survey year by t. The
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outcome variable y describes the mortality status for child i, born to mother m, residing
in DHS cluster l, in year a, and who was surveyed in year t. The main treatment variable
rainfallla is birth year rainfall deviation, which is defined as rainfall at the cluster l in
logarithm minus its long-term average in logarithm (Maccini and Yang, 2009). Ximlcat
and Zmlct represents child level and mother level observed characteristics. Similar to
equation (6), θa is child birth year fixed effects, and γmlct represents mother fixed effects.
Compared to equation (6) using competca as the main treatment variable, the rainfall
variable rainfallla is less likely to be endogenous, as the rainfall is widely used as an
exogenous shock in many previous works (Hyland and Russ, 2019; Maccini and Yang,
2009). However, to test the sensibility of rainfall regressions in equation (7), I include
similar covariates to capture country level time-varying factors as equation (6).
yimlcat = β0 + β1competca + β2rainfallla + β3competca × rainfallla
+ β2Ximlcat + β3Zmlct + θa + γmlct + εimlcat (8)
Finally, I estimate equation (8) for the third hypothesis. Child is indexed by i, mother
by m, DHS cluster by l, country by c, birth year by a, and survey year by t. I include
both competca and rainfallla from equation (6) and (7), and their interaction term
competca × rainfallla. I want to measure whether the effects of political competition on
child mortality rates can be heterogeneous respected to different rainfall in the birth year.
To make the interpretation clearer, I report the marginal average treatment effects. It is
possible that rainfall may affect election outcomes. For example, in rich rainfall years,
farming workers have better harvest, hence more likely to cast vote on the incumbent
president. This issue may bias the estimate. However, since I measure the rainfall at
DHS cluster level, in which each cluster only contains a very small part of the country.




Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables. The sample is restricted to
rural areas because climate factors (e.g., rainfall) are more likely to have a larger impact
in rural areas. In general, child mortality in SSA countries are relatively high. Child
mortality rates by age one, three, and five are 8.7%, 12.4%, and 13.1%, respectively.
The main variables of interest are political competition and rainfall deviation, and the
means of them are 0.0303 and -0.0098, respectively. Summary statistics of other control
variables are also listed in Table 5.
Results for the effects of political competition on child mortality by age one are re-
ported in Table 6, and they are estimated by Equation (6). I include different specifica-
tions of control variables and fixed effects to test the sensitivities of different estimates.
In column (1), I control for mother fixed effects and I find a one unit increase in political
competition decreases child mortality at age one by 0.4859. This indicates a one standard
deviation increase in political competition reduces child mortality at one by 9.4% of the
mean.14 In column (2), I include a dummy for girl to capture gender difference, birth
order variable, and two dummies to consider runner-off and incumbent president impacts.
In addition, as noted in Section 4, I also control for annual prices of the main export
and import goods, including oil, aluminum, bananas, cocoa, coffee, cotton, groundnuts,
logs, maize, rice, tea and uranium. These variables are served to reduce the partial cor-
relation between the error terms and the main political competition variable of interest.
I find a one unit increase in political competition decreases child mortality at age one
by 0.3109. In column (3), I include additional time interacted with regional and colonial
background fixed effects to control most of the annual changes in each country, and I find
a one unit increase in political competition is associated with child mortality by 0.2265.
In column (4) (5), and (6), I test birth year effects in addition to mother fixed effects,
14(−0.4859 × 0.0168/0.0866) × 100% = −9.42%
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control variables, and regional specific time trend to capture birth year specific shocks.
All estimates are highly statistically significant, though with slightly lower magnitudes.
Summarily, in Table 6, I find strong effects of political competition on child mortality by
age one.
In Table 7, I repeat the empirical specifications in Table 6 for child mortality rates by
age three. In column (6), I include mother fixed effects, all other control variables, and
regional time trends. I find a one unit increase in political competition is associated with
0.2127 unit decrease in child mortality by age three; that is, a one standard deviation
increase in political competition is associated with 4% decrease in child mortality. In
Table 8, I find similar effects that more competitively political competition reduces child
mortality by age five statistically significantly across all the specifications from column
(1) to (6).15
Next, I examine how positive rainfall shocks affect child mortality by age one using
Equation (7), and results are present in Table 9. In column (1), controlling for mother
fixed effects, a one unit increase in rainfall deviation is associated with 0.0057 unit de-
crease in child mortality. This indicates a one standard deviation of a positive rainfall
shock decreases child mortality by 1.17% of the mean.16 I include additional control
variables in column (2) and control for regional specific time trends in column (3), but
results are not statistically significant. I also investigate imposing birth year fixed effects,
though results are not statistically significant in column (4), (5), and (6). A possible ex-
planation can be that mother fixed effects have already absorbed a lot of variation, so
that the additional birth year fixed effects wipe out most yearly variations for the rainfall
variable.
Similar to Table 9, I explore effects of rainfall shocks on child mortality by age three in
Table 10. In column (1), I find a one unit positive rainfall shock reduces child mortality
at three by 0.0175 (2.5% of the mean). Including control variables in column (2) and
15I also test including per capita GDP (current US$) or its lagging value as another control. Main results do not change
qualitatively. However, in main Tables 6-14, I do not include per capita GDP as a control variable. Because per capita
GDP is more likely to be an outcome variable of political competition, so including it can cause “bad controls” problems.
Using lagging value cannot deal with this issue since a freshly elected president will be in office for multiple years.
16(−0.0057 × 0.178/0.0866) × 100% = −1.17%
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regional time trends in column (3) still have significant negative estimates, but with
smaller magnitudes. However, controlling for birth year fixed effects in column (4),
(5), and (6) yield insignificant estimates. Finally, I test how rainfall shocks affect child
mortality by age five in Table 11. I find strong effects that a positive rainfall shock
decreases child mortality without birth year fixed effects. Including birth year fixed
effects still pertain some significance but not very strong.
I now focus on the interaction effects of political competition and rainfall shocks. I
want to investigate whether the effects of political competition on child mortality rates
can be heterogeneous respected to different rainfall in the birth year. Table 12 reports
the interaction effects on child mortality by age one. In Panel A column (1), I find the
competition variable is still a significant negative number (-0.4851) and almost identical to
column (1) in Table 3, where the political competition effects are estimated independently.
But the rainfall variable becomes insignificant. The interaction is a significant point
estimate of -0.3605. To make the interaction term interpretative, I report the marginal
average treatment effects of political competition and rainfall deviation variable in Panel
B column (1). The point estimate is a significant -0.4814 for the political competition
variable and an insignificant -0.0044 for the rainfall variable. Since the marginal average
treatment effects of political competition are almost identical to column (1) in Table 6,
I do not find any significant interaction effects on child mortality by age one. I also
explore different combinations of control variables, regional time trends, and birth year
fixed effects through column (2) to (5), and I obtain similar outcomes as column (1).
In Table 13, I examine the interaction effects of political competition and rainfall for
child mortality before age three. Generally speaking, most estimates for child mortality
at age three are similar to age one shown in Table 12. The only notable difference is the
marginal average treatment effects of rainfall become significant in Panel B column (1),
(2), and (3). But the marginal effects of rainfall shocks are much smaller than political
competition shocks (e.g., in column (1), -0.7204 for political competition and -0.0156 for
rainfall). This shows positive rainfall shocks are less effective to reduce child mortality
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when political competition is more competitive. It may suggest that positive rainfall
shocks are not complementary to more competitive political competitions. Therefore,
when a positive shock is added to another one, a basic economic principle “diminishing
return to scale” may be the reason to explain the findings. This reconciles the work by
Brückner and Ciccone (2011). They find democratic institutions improve significantly
following negative rainfall shocks (e.g., drought). Table 14 shows the results for child
mortality by age five. Again, I obtain similar results.
5.2. Additional Results
All results in Table 6 through Table 14 are based rural sample in SSA countries. Can
I find similar results using urban sample? In Table A6, I test the effects of political
competition on child mortality by age three for urban sample. It is noticeable that
observations are only about one third of urban sample, whereby most African residents
were living in rural areas during the sample period 1988 – 2013. Compared to Table 7 for
the rural sample, I still find strong effects that a more competitive political competition
decreases child mortally, while the magnitudes are little smaller. This is consistent with
the hypothesis about urban/ rural bias, which refers that welfare improvement is stronger
in rural Africa.
In Table A7, I test the effects of rainfall shocks on child mortality by age three in
urban sample. I do not find any statistically significant effects. Table A8 reports the
interaction effects of political competition and rainfall on child mortality before age three.
In Table A9 and A10, I explore the gender differences. As shown in main results, the
coefficient on the girl dummy is a significant negative number. This refers that in SSA
countries, girls have a lower child mortality than boys. From Table A9 and Table A10, I
find in general, political competition has large effects on boys than girls to reduce child
mortality.
Finally, in Table A11, I explore how political competition can affect country level
variables like GDP capita and health related expenditure. I find more competitive presi-
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dential elections have significant effects on most health related expenditure variables but
not GDP capita. This provides suggestive evidence on potential mechanisms.
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this study, I empirically test three hypotheses that affect child mortality rates based
on rural sample in Sub-Saharan African countries. I find a more competitive presidential
election has significant effects to reduce child mortality in subsequent years during the
period when the freshly elected president is in the office. This demonstrates convincingly
the extent to which political competition can affect economic policy and economic out-
comes. I find a positive birth year rainfall shock is associated with lower child mortality
rates. This means the birth year environment has significant impacts in later years after
the birth. I also discuss the interactive effects between competitive presidential comple-
tion and positive rainfall shocks, and I find the marginal average treatment effects are
smaller for rainfall shocks. This indicates a positive rainfall shock may be less effective
during a more competitive election time. I interpret this cautiously that the overall
impact of favorable environmental and political conditions on child mortality exhibits a
certain degree of “diminishing return to scale”. It is stronger at the initial levels and the




BROADBAND, SELF-EMPLOYMENT, AND WORK-FROM-HOME
— EVIDENCE FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY
1. Introduction
With the technological expansion of broadband since 2000s, high-speed internet be-
comes accessible and adoptable for more population. However, the adoption to high-
speed internet is not evenly distributed in the U.S., even for the recent years. Figure
7 shows the distribution of adoption to high-speed broadband in the U.S. from 2013 -
2017. It is clear that the adoption of broadband is mature in metropolitan areas but
still lagging in rural areas.
Previous works find access to high-speed broadband affects many economic factors
including the labor market, local economic growth, and the college enrollment (Det-
tling et al., 2018; Kolko, 2012; Xu et al., 2019). For example, using slope of terrain
steepness as an instrumental variable for broadband, Kolko (2012) shows broadband
expansion is associated with higher local economic growth and employment growth.
Dettling et al. (2018) examines the impact of high-speed broadband on college appli-
cations and they find access to high-speed broadband has positive effects on college
applications. They argue that the main mechanism is the development of broadband
technology considerably reduce students’ effort to apply for schools.
In this paper, the main research question I want to address is how the adoption and
access to broadband affect the labor market. Specially, I examine how adoption and
access to broadband influence self-employment (SE) and work-from-home (WFH)
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based on married women. The existing works show that married females are more
likely to be self-employed due to various reasons (Cai et al., 2019; Patrick et al., 2016). For
instance, Cai et al. (2019) point out that married women spend more time on household
work, so self-employment provides the flexibility to choose when to work and how much
to work. Patrick et al. (2016) suggest a comprehensive set of factors determining self-
employment status and they find different factors for married and unmarried women.
For married women, household burdens associated with children are more like to be
the driven factors. But for unmarried women, the local business climate and individual
characteristics are important factors.
The closest work to this study is Dettling (2017). The author examines the effects of
high-speed internet on married women’s labor force participation. The main conclusion is
that the use of high-speed internet leads an increase in labor force participation of married
women. The author briefly tests the effects of broadband on self-employment but does
not obtain statistically significant effects. My paper is different from Dettling (2017) in
many perspectives and contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the
dependent variable in this paper incorporates SE, WFH, and their combinations, so I
can investigate the effects of broadband on different labor market outcomes. Second, I
use the most recent 2013-2017 American Community Survey (ACS) as the main data.
In this way, I can provide up-to-date inference for policy makers based on one of the
largest and most reliable census survey data in the U.S. Third, my empirical analyses
are based on the ACS self-reported internet data as well as the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) internet data. The effects of adoption of broadband can be estimated
using the ACS self-reported internet data and FCC household connections to high-speed
broadband data, while access to broadband can be estimated using FCC numbers of
high-speed broadband providers’ data. With different sources of broadband data, this




2.1. Broadband and Its Impacts
The relationship between broadband and economic outcomes are correlated at the local
level (Kolko, 2012). A majority of literature finds the availability of local broadband
connections have strong positive effects on local economic indicators, such as population
growth, employment growth, college enrollment, and innovation (Dettling et al., 2018;
Kolko, 2012; Xu et al., 2019). The main mechanism whereby broadband contributes to
local economic development is the availability of internet connections allows higher levels
of economic activities.
Kolko (2012) examines the impacts of access to broadband on local employment growth
and other indicators, and the author shows that access to broadband is strongly associated
with local employment growth, but with lower median household incomes. It suggests
that the availability of broadband attracts more migrants, from which increase the local
labor supply, leaving the employment rate and average pay unchanged. In addition, this
paper proposes a new instrumental variable to deal with endogeneity issues for access
to broadband. Specifically, broadband construction can be both demand and supply
driven, and it is correlated with many local indicators. Kolko (2012) argues that average
slope of the local terrain is a valid instrument for broadband availability, as it satisfies
both correlation and exclusion for a good instrument. Construction of broadband is
associated with higher cost in steeper terrain, so broadband is negatively correlated with
the slope of terrain. This instrument also satisfies the exclusion criteria, since the slope
of local terrain is not likely directly associated with local economic growth. In addition to
Kolko (2012), a large number of studies find access to broadband improves local economic
growth (Ivus and Boland, 2015; Van Gaasbeck, 2008; Whitacre et al., 2014).
Besides local employment and economic growth, a wide local economic indicators
are examined by the existing literature. Dettling et al. (2018) investigate whether the
availability of broadband can improve students’ postsecondary outcomes. They find the
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availability of broadband during students’ junior year encourage students to send more
college applications, apply to more out-of-state universities, and get higher SAT scores.
The authors suggest that the main mechanism is that the availability of broadband tech-
nology directly decreases efforts and costs associated with the application process. Some
papers find broadband diffusion affects entrepreneurships, business start-ups, R&D col-
laborations, and Innovation. Using data in Ohio as a case study, Mack (2014) finds
fast-speed broadband is an important factor for agricultural and rural business estab-
lishments. Tranos and Mack (2016) show that an increase in number of broadband
providers is associated with more knowledge-intensive business services. Parajuli and
Haynes (2017) examine the impacts of broadband on new firm formation using data from
Florida and Ohio, and the authors find positive effects exist but vary spatially. Based
on spatial econometric models, Mack et al. (2011) find broadband infrastructure is im-
portant for knowledge intensive firms to locate in certain areas. Forman and Zeebroeck
(2012) study the effects of adoption of internet on firm patents and find significant effects
that internet adoption increases the likelihood of collaborative patents from geograph-
ically dispersed teams. Finally, Xu et al. (2019) find access to internet is associated
with increased patents, and they suggest the mechanism is internet connection reduces
disseminating costs of filling patents locally.
Apart from the positive effects of broadband, a narrower amount of works studies that
broadband is negatively correlated with some local economic indicators, shedding light
on the social challenges from increased internet access. Conley et al. (2016) find that a
high level of broadband adoption may have negative impacts on number of entrepreneurs
and creative class employees in rural America. Chan et al. (2016) examine the relation-
ship between internet and racial hate crime and show that broadband access increases
racial hate crimes. Similarly, using data from Norway, Bhuller et al. (2013) find that
access to broadband increases sex crime propensity, possibly due to factors like increased
consumption of pornography.
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2.2. Self-Employment and Work-from-Home
Why workers leave wage employment and select into SE? Earlier works by Boden Jr (1996,
1999) discuss several possible reasons. First, workers’ wage employment experience affects
the probability of self-employed. Specifically, workers employed in small businesses are
more likely to leave wage employment and become self-employed. Second, as for gender
differences, responsibility for childcare is an important factor that pushes women into self-
employment, while for men, presence of children is not an important determinant of self-
employment. Third, workers in certain occupations such as clerical and administrative
are more likely to switch to self-employment. Budig (2006) also argue that the effects of
family structure on self-employment differ by occupational classes. Bruce (1999) show
that husbands can affect wives’ decision of self-employment. The author finds having
a husband with self-employment experience increases the likelihood that a wife is self-
employed.
Besides family and occupations, individual characteristics are strong predictors of self-
employment. For example, Carr (1996) shows that human capital factors like education,
age, and past working experience are important factors that influence self-employment
for both men and women. In addition, some psychological factors may also affect self-
employment. Clain (2000) mentions that women who are engaging in full self-employment
may be less highly valued as women who work for full-time wage employment in the
marketplace. Fairlie and Meyer (1996) investigate ethnic and racial factors that affect
self-employment, and they find that racial groups immigrated from countries with high
self-employment rate are less likely to be self-employed in the U.S.
Besides all the factors and determinants of self-employment across different groups,
Hamilton (2000) analyses the returns of self-employment compared to wage employment.
The author argues that the returns of self-employment are not only from earnings, but
also from nonpecuniary benefits, such as “being your own boss”. This implies that self-
employed workers are willing to sacrifice substantial amount of earnings in exchange
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to nonpecuniary benefits such as flexibility of working and owning a business. Hundley
(2000) discusses earning differences between women and men respect to household factors.
The author finds that self-employed women’s earnings decline with marriage, family size,
and hours of housework, while for self-employed men, earnings increase with marriage
and family sizes.
Compared to self-employment, working from home is more related to the location of
work, but not the intrinsic characteristics of work — self or wage employment. Therefore,
it is intuitive that the adoption of broadband is likely to increase the probability of work-
from-home, because of the easiness and convenience people receive from the home internet
service. The existing literature related to work-from-home is scant but emerging in recent
two years, especially after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
One of the earlier works by Felstead et al. (2001) propose seven hypotheses related to
WFH. They suggest internet is a key facilitator for working from home and working from
home is predominately a female activity. Felstead et al. (2002) find working from home
is more likely to achieve work-life balance. Sarbu (2015) point out the determinants of
WFH contain education, tenure status, use of computers, and presence of young children.
However, Hill et al. (2003) hold a different view that WFH may blur the boundaries of
work and family balance for certain occupations, which would result to less successful
personal or family life.
Using Chinese travel company data, Bloom (2014) and Bloom et al. (2015) find workers
who are allowed to telecommute and work-from-home are less likely to leave the company
and more productive. The author suggests that one to two days working from home per
week is beneficial to workers’ well-being, especially for the occupations that remote work
can be accomplished easily such as working at call centers. But the positive effects may
not exist for some occupations, as it is not feasible for some type of workers to work from
home. Moreover, the authors also suggest there are some potential problems of WFH,
such as it is hard for employers to evaluate employee’s performance.
A recent work by Dingel and Neiman (2020) investigates what jobs can be done at
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home. They find like computer, education, training, business, and financial occupations
can be done at home, but construction, extraction, food preparation, and maintenance
occupations are almost impossible to be accomplished at home. Belzunegui-Eraso and
Erro-Garcés (2020) suggest during the Covid-19 pandemic, allowing employees to tele-
work is a good way to ensure employees’ safety while provide continuity to economic
activities. Gottlieb et al. (2021) propose a measure of the ability to WFH from develop-
ing countries. They suggest workers are less educated and in low-wage occupations are
less likely to work remotely, and WFH ability is not only related to occupations but also
the nature of tasks within occupations.
3. Data
The main data is obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS) via IPUMS
(Ruggles et al., 2020). The ACS is an annual survey of one percent of U.S. popula-
tion, and collects labor force and employment, demographics, education, migration, and
other information. From 2013, the ACS starts to report two internet related variables
— access to internet and subscription to high-speed broadband. These two variables
are at a household level. I use these two variables to measure adoption of broadband
and high-speed broadband. In particular, I use ACS 2013-2017 from which these two
internet related variables are reported. To protect confidentiality, the smallest identified
geographic areas are Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA).17
In addition to two self-reported internet variables, I obtain a second source of internet
data from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Previous literature notes
FCC broadband data is one of the highest quality data for broadband (Grubesic and
Mack, 2015). Specifically, I use two variables from FCC form 477 data on internet access
services. The first variable reports share of population with access to high-speed internet,
and this variable is used for the adoption of broadband. I aggregate this data from a
17To protect confidentiality, the smallest identified geographic areas in ACS 2013-2017 is Public Use Microdata Area
(PUMA). PUMA is generally following county boundaries. For small counties with less than 100K residents, they are
combined as a PUMA. There are 2,351 unique PUMAs covering the entire U.S.
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census tract level to a PUMA level. The second variable reports number of high-speed
broadband providers, and it is used to measure the local access to high-speed broadband.
I aggregate this data from a census block level to a PUMA level. The last data source
used in this study is USDA topography index. I use this variable as instrumental variables
for high-speed broadband providers.
Combining all the data sources, the main analytical sample is restricted to married
women, covering the entire U.S. at a PUMA level, from 2013-2017. Because broad-
band providers’ information is not compatible across the entire 2013-2017, regressions
concerning access to broadband are based on 2014-2016 data only.
4. Methods and Models
In the main specification, I estimate a linear probability model (LPM) to investigate the
probability of SE and WFH:
yimt = β0 + β1Broadbandimt + γ1Ximt + γ2Pmt + πm + ϕrt + µimt (9)
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if an individual i living
in PUMA m in year t is self-employed, work-from-home, or combinations of these two.
Two ACS reported internet related variables are used as the main treatment variable
Broadbandimt. The first one is a dummy equal to one if an individual has subscription
to high-speed internet. The second one is a dummy equal to one if an individual has
adoption to internet. Ximt is a set of individual control variables including age, age
square, race groups, and education levels. Pmt is a set of PUMA specific control variables
including share of population with a bachelor degree or above. πm is PUMA fixed effects
and ϕrt is survey year by region fixed effects to absorb time-invariant confounders at
PUMA level and region specific shocks in year t.18 µimt is the error term. The main
sample includes married women age between 18 and 59.
18The four US Census regions are the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.
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Self-reported internet variables from the ACS may have measurement errors and more
importantly, are possibility endogenous. It is not possible to control all the confounders
in the error term correlated with the main internet treatment variable, so I employ FCC
local adoption to broadband data as a second source for broadband. I slightly modify
equation (9) to run LPM in equation (10):
yimt = β0 + β1Broadbandmt + γ1Ximt + γ2Pmt + πm + ϕrt + µimt (10)
Compared to equation (9), equation (10) revises the main variable of interest from
Broadbandimt to Broadbandmt. Broadbandmt is a continuous variable measures resi-
dential fixed high-speed connections over 200 kbps in at least one direction per code
connections per 1000 Households.19 FCC categorizes number of connections per 1,000
households into six groups: zero if no connections, one if connections are greater than
zero and lower than 200, two if connections are greater than 200 and lower than 400, three
if connections are greater than 400 and lower than 600, four if connections are greater
than 600 and lower than 800, five if connections are greater 800. Although there are
only six groups in the original FCC census tract data, this variable becomes a continuous
variable range from zero to five after aggregated to a PUMA level.
Based on equation (10), to quantify the effects of local access to high-speed broad-
band, I use number of high-speed broadband providers as Broadbandmt. Specifically,
this variable measures number of providers that can or do provide internet access service
at least 10 Mbps downstream and 1 Mbps upstream to at least one residential location.
The original FCC data is at a census block level, so I aggregate this variable to a PUMA
level using the average number of broadband providers.
FCC reported broadband providers’ data may be still correlated with unobserved
factors in the error term and it is not possible to capture all the unobserved confounders.
This will cause endogeneity and bias the estimates. In light of the previous literature, I use
land surface terrain as topography instrumental variables (IVs) for FCC access to internet
19FCC census tract data: https://www.fcc.gov/general/form-477-census-tract-data-internet-access-services.
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variable Kolko (2012). Construction of broadband incurs high fixed costs especially in
areas with unfavorable topography. According to Kolko (2012), flatter terrain constitutes
good geography for broadband deployment. I use USDA land surface index as a proxy
to steepness of terrain. This index has 21 values. Larger values mean steeper areas. For
example, one means flat plains, 11 means plains with high mountains, and 21 means
high mountains. A good instrument requires both correlation and exclusion. As noted
in Kolko (2012), flatter areas are more viable for broadband construction, so larger land
surface topography index areas are less likely to attain broadband. But the steepness of
terrain is less likely correlated with the self-employment and work-from-home variables
directly. In equation (10), I include PUMA fixed effects, in which absorbs time-invariant
variables including the land surface topography index. So, I interact the land surface
topography index with year dummies to construct the instruments to allow PUMA fixed
effects Chan et al. (2016). Since I use the year dummies interacted with the land surface




Figure 7 shows the mean distribution of adoption to broadband from 2013-2017 based
on FCC broadband data. It indicates the spread of broadband is not evenly distributed
in the U.S. In the central U.S. areas, there are still many places with less than 75%
adoption to high-speed broadband. Figure 8 displays the distribution of average high-
speed providers from 2014-2016. Table 15 shows the descriptive statistics for all the
variables used for regressions and grouping criteria for sub-sample estimation.
Table 16 presents the results estimated by equation (9) using the ACS adoption to
high-speed broadband variable as the main treatment variable. This variable is a dummy
equal to one if a member has subscription to the internet using high-speed broadband
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such as cable, fiber optic, or DSL service. To explore MSA and non-MSA areas’ het-
erogeneities, estimation sample is restricted to non-MSA areas in Panel A, and MSA
areas in Panel B. In Panel A, column (1) shows the adoption to high-speed broadband
increases the probability to be SE by 0.7%. In column (2), the dependent variable is the
WFH dummy. It shows adoption to high-speed broadband increases the probability of
WFH by 0.82%. I also estimate different combinations of SE and WFH in column (3),
(4), and (5). In particular, the dependent variable is WFH and SE in column (3); the
dependent variable is WFH but not SE in column (4); and the dependent variable is SE
but not WFH in column (5). I find statistically significant positive effects of adoption
to high-speed broadband on WFH and SE combinations in all column (3), (4), and (5),
though the magnitudes are smaller than column (1) and (2). Results for MSA sample are
presented in Panel B. All the estimates are similar to non-MSA estimation in Panel A.
This shows for adoption of high-speed broadband, effects are not very different between
non-MSA and MSA areas. It may suggest that broadband adoption is more related to
the demand side, which is not largely affected by the access of broadband from the supply
side as the broadband infrastructure is broadly available in recent years.
In Table 17, I estimate the effects of adoption of high-speed broadband on SE and
WFH separated for women with children in Panel A, and women without children in
Panel B. In Panel A column (1), adoption to high-speed broadband is associated with
0.76% increase in SE; while in column (2), adoption to high-speed broadband is associated
with 0.82% increase in WFH. Significantly positive effects are also obtained in column
(3), (4), and (5). Effects on women without children are reported in Panel B, and all the
estimates are similar to Panel A. In summary, Table 16 and 17 show that the adoption
to high-speed broadband has significant effects to increase SE and WFH, and the effects
are similar between non-MSA and MSA areas, and women with or without children.
In Table 18, I estimate equation (1) again using ACS adoption to broadband variable
for non-MSA and MSA sample. The main treatment variable is assigned to one if a
member of the household has adoption to broadband. Compared to the main high-speed
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broadband variable in Table 16, adoption to broadband does not restrict the speed of
internet. Similar to Table 16, I find statistically positive effects in all the columns in
Table 18. For example, Panel A column (1) shows adoption of broadband increases
the probability of SE by 1.5%. In Table 19, estimation is separated for women with
and without children. I also find significant effects in all columns in both Panel A and
Panel B. Results obtained in Table 16 through 19 are estimated by using the ACS self-
reported broadband variables, so there may be measurement errors or endogeneity issues.
Although I include a comprehensive set of control variables, there may be unobserved
factors that may bias the estimation.
Table 20 reports regression results estimated by equation (10). In this Table, I use the
FCC reported local adoption of broadband variable at a PUMA level as the main treat-
ment variable. In Panel A column (1), it shows local adoption of high-speed broadband
increases by 20% is associated with 1.03% increase in SE. No statistically significant ef-
fects are obtained on WFH in column (2). For MSA sample estimates reported in Panel
B, I still find significant positive effects of local adoption of high-speed broadband on
SE not WFH, but the coefficients are much smaller. In general, Table 20 shows higher
adoption of broadband encourages SE but not WFH, and effects are stronger for non-
MSA areas. This may suggest local adoption of high-speed broadband has higher effects
for non-MSA areas than MSA areas, possibly because MSA areas have high levels of
broadband adoption, additional adoption may have lower effects to increase SE. Table
21 presents how local adoption of high-speed broadband affects SE and WFH for women
with children and without children. It shows that the effects are stronger for women
without children.
Table 16 through 21 focus on how the adoption of broadband affects SE and WFH
decisions. Results for the impacts of access to broadband on SE and WFH are shown in
Table 22 to Table 25. I use number of local high-speed broadband providers to measure
access to broadband, but due to data limitation, the data is consistent from 2014-2016.
So, the main estimation sample is restricted to ACS 2014-2016.
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Table 22 presents the effects of broadband providers on SE and WFH for non-MSA
sample in Panel A and MSA sample in Panel B. For non-MSA sample, more high-speed
broadband providers are associated with higher probability of WFH but not SE. For
example, in column (4), the point estimate is 0.00175, which shows a one unit increase in
broadband providers increases the probability of WFH by 0.18%. MSA sample estimation
is reported in Panel B, and I find high-speed broadband providers have statistically
significant effects in all column (1) to (5). Table 23 shows the effects of broadband
providers on SE and WFH for women with children in Panel A and women without
children in Panel B. Most estimates are positive and statistically significant except Panel
B column (1) and (5), which show that access to high-speed broadband providers have
no significant effects on WFH.
As noted in the previous literature, access to broadband is not exogenous (Kolko,
2012). For example, areas with potentially higher economic growth rate due to unob-
served factors may have higher broadband coverage. In light of the existing works, I
use USDA topography index interacted with the year dummies as instrumental variables
for high-speed broadband providers (Kolko, 2012; Chan et al., 2016). IV results are re-
ported in Table 24 and 25 and their first stage estimates are shown in Table A16. Table
24 presents results for non-MSA sample in Panel A and MSA results are shown in Panel
B. In Panel A column (1), a one unit increase in high-speed broadband providers is as-
sociated with 0.62% increase in SE. In column (2), I find a one unit increase in providers
raises the probability of WFH by 0.65%. Panel B shows similar effects for MSA sample
as non-MSA sample in Panel A. Table 25 shows the IV estimation separated for women
with children and without children. I find significant effects of broadband on SE for
women with children but not women without children. This is consistent with the previ-
ous works that women with children are more likely to choose SE due to they are more
responsible for household work. The impacts of broadband on WFH are significant for
both women with or without children.
Comparing results estimated by broadband adoption versus broadband access, I find
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in general, both adoption and access to broadband contribute to women’s SE or WFH
decisions, but the broadband adoption seems to have stronger effects. There are three
possible reasons. First, the main data used for analyses are very recent data (2013-2017).
Broadband construction started to roll out in the U.S. in early 2000s, but after more
than a decade, the access of broadband become available for most areas (see Figure 8).
This may indicate now the adoption of broadband is more important than access to
broadband for labor market decisions like SE and WFH in the recent years. Second, due
to the FCC data availability, numbers of broadband providers’ data are only consistent for
year 2014-2016 but not 2013 and 2017. So, effects of broadband adoption and broadband
access on SE and WFH may not directly comparable. Third, for broadband adoption
estimation, I include a rich set of control variables, but cannot offer a clean causal effect
identification. Moreover, using land topography as an IV for broadband access is clearly
exogenous using early years’ broadband data (Kolko, 2012). However, this IV may not
be fully functional for more recent broadband data as the construction of broadband was
upgraded and became easier even in areas with steep terrain.
5.2. Additional Results
I also test several other outcome variables related to SE and WFH. If some marginal
workers choose to SE or WFH from being out of the labor force, the hours worked per
week might decrease (Cai et al., 2019). In Table A12, I show how high-speed broadband
affects hours worked per week for women living in non-MSA and MSA areas. In Panel
A column (2), adoption to high-speed broadband decreases hours worked per week by
0.75 for WFH women. I find larger negative effects for WHF and SE sample in column
(3). Table A13 presents the effects of adoption to high-speed broadband on hours worked
per week for women with and without children. I find significantly negative effects in
Panel A column (3). Finally, in Table A14 and A15, I test whether access to high-speed
broadband have effects on women’s labor force participation rate. Similar to Dettling
(2017), I find the adoption of broadband has significant positive effects on labor force
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participation for married women.
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, based on the ACS and FCC broadband data, I empirically assess the effects
of adoption and access to broadband on SE and WFH for married women. I find both
adoption and access to high-speed broadband increase the probabilities of SE and WFH.
The positive effects are stronger for women living in non-MSA areas and women with
children. This paper contributes to the existing literature that examines how ICT affects
the labor market. During the period of ongoing COVID-19, people realize the importance
of WFH, which is safer and can slow the spread of virus. Without high-speed internet,
WFH would become much more difficult. Based on the ACS data, this paper identifies
the positive effects of adoption to internet on SE, WFH, and their combinations. It
suggests for the recent years as the broadband infrastructure is widely available, how to
increase the local adoption of high-speed internet becomes a more important question.
Adoption of broadband is related to household income levels and whether there is a need
for that. Therefore, for the policy implications, stipend from the government to lower the
cost of high-speed broadband adoption may be a good place-based policy, especially for
low income and less developed areas. Consequently, this place-based policy may promote
local well-being and economic growth.
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Popp, D., Pless, J., Haščič, I., and Johnstone, N. (2020). Innovation and entrepreneur-
ship in the energy sector. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rickman, D. S., Wang, H., and Winters, J. V. (2017). Is shale development drilling
holes in the human capital pipeline? Energy Economics, 62:283–290.
Rozell, D. J. and Reaven, S. J. (2012). Water pollution risk associated with natural
gas extraction from the marcellus shale. Risk Analysis: An International Journal,
32(8):1382–1393.
Ruggles, S., Flood, S., Goeken, R., Grover, J., Meyer, E., Pacas, J., and Sobek, M.
(2020). Ipums usa. IPUMS USA: Version 10.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS,
https://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V10.0.
Sarbu, M. (2015). Determinants of work-at-home arrangements for german employees.
Labour, 29(4):444–469.
56
Selb, P. (2009). A deeper look at the proportionality—turnout nexus. Comparative
Political Studies, 42(4):527–548.
Shah, M. and Steinberg, B. M. (2017). Drought of opportunities: Contemporaneous
and long-term impacts of rainfall shocks on human capital. Journal of Political
Economy, 125(2):527–561.
Shakya, S. (2019). The dark side of the shale boom–increased crime among
economically-small, relatively rural american states: Generalized synthetic control
approach. Technical report, Technical report, West Virginia University.
Simonen, J. and McCann, P. (2008). Firm innovation: The influence of r&d coop-
eration and the geography of human capital inputs. Journal of Urban Economics,
64(1):146–154.
Stigler, G. J. (1972). Economic competition and political competition. Public Choice,
pages 91–106.
Tolbert, C. M. and Sizer, M. (1996). Us commuting zones and labor market areas: A
1990 update. Technical report.
Torres-Preciado, V. H., Polanco-Gaytán, M., and Tinoco-Zermeño, M. Á. (2014).
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Figure 1: Mean Drilling Well Density by Year, 2000-2015
Source: Data is from Enverus.com. Non-Vertical Well Density is calculated as new non-vertical
wells divided by total land area in 1000 square miles. Vertical Well Density is calculated as new
vertical drilling wells divided by total land area in 1000 square miles.
Figure 2: Mean CZ Patents per 100K Population by Year, 2000-2015
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
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Figure 3: Mean CZ Patents per 100K Population by Groups in Year 2000-2015
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and Enverus.com. Control groups include
CZs without any non-vertical drilling wells in 2000-2015. Treatment groups include CZs with at
least one non-vertical drilling wells in 2000-2015.
Figure 4: Mean CZ Patents per 100K Population Differences by Groups in Year 2000-2015
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and Enverus.com. The figure plots
differences in patents per 100K population between CZs in the treatment group and the control
group presented in Figure 3.
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Figure 5: Mean New Non-Vertical Drilling Well Density Year 2000-2015
Source: Enverus.com. Non-Vertical Well Density is calculated as new non-vertical wells divided
by total land area in 1000 square miles.
Figure 6: Mean Patent per 100K Population Year 2000-2015
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
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Figure 7: Mean Adoption to High-Speed Broadband 2013-2017
Source: Federal Communications Commission (FCC). FCC categorizes broadband connections
per 1,000 households into six groups: zero if no connections, one if connections are greater than
zero and lower than 200, two if connections are greater than 200 and lower than 400, three if
connections are greater than 400 and lower than 600, four if connections are greater than 600 and
lower than 800, five if connections are greater 800.
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Figure 8: Mean Numbers of High-Speed Broadband Providers 2014-2016
Source: Federal Communications Commission (FCC). High-speed broadband providers are
defined as number of providers that can or do provide internet access service at least 10 Mbps




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Main Full Sample and Border Contiguity Sample Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Full Sample
Non-Vertical Well Density -0.0294*** -0.0286*** -0.0221***
(0.0090) (0.0081) (0.0065)
Observations 11,280 11,280 11,280
Panel B: Border Contiguity
Non-Vertical Well Density -0.0306*** -0.0278*** -0.0229***
(0.0095) (0.0082) (0.0060)
Observations 6,688 6,688 6,688
CZ FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
CZ Linear Trend No Yes No
Notes: The sample includes years 2000-2015. In Panel A, analytical sample includes 705 CZs in 48 lower U.S.
states excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and District of Columbia. In Panel B, analytical sample includes 418 CZs in 48
lower U.S. states excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and District of Columbia based on border contiguity. Specifically, CZs
with at least one non-vertical drilling well and their contiguous CZs are included in the sample; other CZs are
excluded. Dependent variable is patent intensity, calculated as patents per 100K population. Non-Vertical Well
Density is calculated as new non-vertical wells divided by total land area in 1000 square miles for each CZ. All the
control variables in Table 1 are included in each column except average patent per 100K population 1990-1999
since it is absorbed by CZ fixed effects. Column (1) reports baseline two-way fixed effects regression; column (2)
includes a CZ linear time trend; column (3) uses interactive fixed effects in equation 2. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and
*** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at CZ-level.
Table 3: First-Difference Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1-Year Diff. 2-Year Diff. 3-Year Diff. 4-Year Diff. 5-Year Diff.
Non-Vertical Well Density -0.0217*** -0.0238*** -0.0289*** -0.0339*** -0.0292**
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0090) (0.0094) (0.0123)
Incre. Dis. to MSA 250K -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0046)
Incre. Dis. to MSA 500K -0.0054* -0.0117** -0.0155* -0.0208* -0.0262*
(0.0031) (0.0059) (0.0088) (0.0126) (0.0151)
Incre. Dis. To MSA 1500K -0.0014** -0.0030** -0.0038** -0.0057* -0.0086**
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0032) (0.0034)
Incre. Dis. To MSA 2000K -0.0012 -0.0025 -0.0028 -0.0043 -0.0047
(0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0045)
Avg. Patent Intensity 90-99 0.0606* 0.1404* 0.1626* 0.2380* 0.2942*
(0.0338) (0.0735) (0.0987) (0.1388) (0.1688)
Observations 10,575 5,640 3,525 2,820 2,115
Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample includes years 2000-2015. Analytical sample includes 705 CZs in 48 lower U.S. states excluding
Alaska, Hawaii, and District of Columbia. Dependent variable is the first differencing patent intensity. Non-vertical
well density is the first differencing new non-vertical well density. In each column, all the control variables and
urban hierarchy variables are included in regressions but only certain variables are reported in the Table. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at CZ-level.
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Table 4: Instrumental Variables Regressions
(1) (2)




Panel B: Second Stage Results
Non-Vertical Well Density -0.0220* -0.0252***
(0.0112) (0.0088)
Observations 11,280 11,280
CZ FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region*Year FE Yes Yes
CZ Linear Trend No Yes
Notes: The sample includes years 2000-2015. Analytical sample includes 705 CZs in 48 lower U.S. states excluding
Alaska, Hawaii, and District of Columbia. Dependent variable is patent intensity, calculated as patents per 100K
population. Panel A reports the first stage results and the F-stats are in square brackets. Panel B reports the
second stage results, in which regress patent intensity on predicted non-vertical drilling well density. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at CZ-level.
66
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Std. Error Min Max
Main dependent variables:
Child mortality by age 1 400447 0.0866 0.281 0 1
Child mortality by age 3 400447 0.124 0.33 0 1
Child mortality by age 5 400447 0.131 0.338 0 1
Main treatment variables:
Political Competition 400447 0.0303 0.0168 0 0.0708
Rainfall Deviation 400447 -0.00976 0.178 -1.852 1.083
Other control variables:
Runoff 400447 0.0929 0.29 0 1
Incumbent 400447 0.65 0.477 0 1
Girl 400447 0.493 0.5 0 1
Birth order 400447 3.97 2.346 1 10
Oil 395550 66.98 44.82 24.49 195.9
Aluminium 395550 1703 436.4 1140 2640
Bananas 395550 544.1 142.2 373.9 975.9
Cocoa 395550 1601 526.8 903.9 3131
Coffee 395550 110.5 40.92 60.37 273.2
Cotton 395550 66.55 16.4 46.26 154.6
Groundnuts 395550 892.8 214.9 640.8 1724
Logs 395550 226.8 58.44 159.9 390.5
Maize 395550 121.4 37.51 88.22 291.8
Rice 395550 301.3 123.3 172.7 700.2
Tea 395550 217.4 38.84 164.2 346.2
Uranium 395550 23.21 23.48 8.285 99.24
Francophones 400447 0.531 0.499 0 1
Sahel 400447 0.293 0.455 0 1
West Africa 400447 0.591 0.492 0 1
East Afirca 400447 0.145 0.352 0 1
South Africa 400447 0.118 0.323 0 1
Country level regressions:
GDP capita 301 553.3 409.1 111.9 2962
Health % GDP 167 5.49 2.462 2.491 11.79
Health capita 167 31.03 19.04 5.259 102.6
Gov. health % all health 167 25.03 10.22 5.053 47.4
Gov. health capita 167 7.312 5.007 1.126 28.67
Gov. health % all exp. 167 6.846 3.124 1.77 16.73
Notes: The sample is restricted to rural areas based on the DHS survey data.
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Table 6: Effects of Political Competition on Child Mortality by Age 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition -0.4859*** -0.3109*** -0.2265*** -0.2895*** -0.2815*** -0.2086***
(0.0442) (0.0449) (0.0470) (0.0442) (0.0454) (0.0477)
Girl -0.0127*** -0.0127*** -0.0126*** -0.0127***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Runoff -0.0087*** -0.0115*** -0.0081*** -0.0112***
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Incumbent -0.0069*** -0.0078*** -0.0059*** -0.0074***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Observations 393,573 387,528 387,528 393,573 387,528 387,528
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age one for all columns. The main independent
variable “Competition” is defined as 100 minus the share of votes of the presidential election winner in percentage.
All sample is restricted to rural areas based on the DHS survey. Control variables include girl dummy, birth order,
runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional trend includes a linear time trend for French
speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South Africa. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01
based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
Table 7: Effects of Political Competition on Child Mortality by Age 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition -0.7308*** -0.3914*** -0.2592*** -0.3674*** -0.3522*** -0.2127***
(0.0535) (0.0530) (0.0552) (0.0521) (0.0535) (0.0560)
Girl -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0127*** -0.0128***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Runoff -0.0114*** -0.0172*** -0.0108*** -0.0170***
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Incumbent -0.0095*** -0.0123*** -0.0080*** -0.0112***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Observations 393,573 387,528 387,528 393,573 387,528 387,528
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age three for all columns. The main
independent variable “Competition” is defined as 100 minus the share of votes of the presidential election winner
in percentage. All sample is restricted to rural areas based on the DHS survey. Control variables include girl
dummy, birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional trend includes a linear
time trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South Africa. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
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Table 8: Effects of Political Competition on Child Mortality by Age 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition -0.7976*** -0.4247*** -0.2809*** -0.3969*** -0.3879*** -0.2336***
(0.0557) (0.0546) (0.0567) (0.0538) (0.0551) (0.0576)
Girl -0.0131*** -0.0131*** -0.0130*** -0.0131***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Runoff -0.0106*** -0.0172*** -0.0101*** -0.0171***
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Incumbent -0.0098*** -0.0130*** -0.0082*** -0.0119***
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Observations 393,573 387,528 387,528 393,573 387,528 387,528
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age five for all columns. The main independent
variable “Competition” is defined as 100 minus the share of votes of the presidential election winner in percentage.
All sample is restricted to rural areas based on the DHS survey. Control variables include girl dummy, birth order,
runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional trend includes a linear time trend for French
speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South Africa. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01
based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
Table 9: Effects of Rainfall on Child Mortality by Age 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rainfall -0.0057** -0.0022 -0.0022 0.0004 -0.0010 0.0001
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Girl -0.0127*** -0.0127*** -0.0126*** -0.0127***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Observations 393,573 387,528 387,528 393,573 387,528 387,528
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age one for all columns. The main independent
variable “Rainfall” is defined as rainfall at a DHS cluster level in logarithm minus its long-term average in
logarithm. All sample is restricted to rural areas based on the DHS survey. Control variables include girl dummy,
birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional trend includes a linear time
trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South Africa. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
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Table 10: Effects of Rainfall on Child Mortality by Age 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rainfall -0.0175*** -0.0086** -0.0080** -0.0056 -0.0066* -0.0045
(0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Girl -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0127*** -0.0128***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Observations 393,573 387,528 387,528 393,573 387,528 387,528
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age three for all columns. The main
independent variable “Rainfall” is defined as rainfall at a DHS cluster level in logarithm minus its long-term
average in logarithm. All sample is restricted to rural areas based on the DHS survey. Control variables include
girl dummy, birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional trend includes a
linear time trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South Africa. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
Table 11: Effects of Rainfall on Child Mortality by Age 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rainfall -0.0194*** -0.0100*** -0.0091** -0.0069* -0.0079** -0.0056
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Girl -0.0131*** -0.0131*** -0.0130*** -0.0131***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Observations 393,573 387,528 387,528 393,573 387,528 387,528
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age five for all columns. The main independent
variable “Rainfall” is defined as rainfall at a DHS cluster level in logarithm minus its long-term average in
logarithm. All sample is restricted to rural areas based on the DHS survey. Control variables include girl dummy,
birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional trend includes a linear time
trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South Africa. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
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Table 12: Effects of Political Competition and Rainfall on Child Mortality by Age 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Original Estimates
Competition -0.4851*** -0.3114*** -0.2276*** -0.2917*** -0.2823*** -0.2095***
(0.0442) (0.0449) (0.0470) (0.0442) (0.0454) (0.0478)
Rainfall 0.0064 0.0062 0.0041 0.0115* 0.0091 0.0070
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062)
Interaction -0.3605** -0.2588 -0.2096 -0.3292* -0.3152* -0.2355
(0.1687) (0.1690) (0.1695) (0.1687) (0.1687) (0.1692)
Girl -0.0127*** -0.0127*** -0.0126*** -0.0127***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Runoff -0.0087*** -0.0115*** -0.0081*** -0.0112***
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Incumbent -0.0069*** -0.0078*** -0.0059*** -0.0073***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Observations 393,573 387,528 387,528 393,573 387,528 387,528
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Marginal Effects
Competition -0.4814*** -0.3082*** -0.2250*** -0.2882*** -0.2784*** -0.2066***
(0.0442) (0.0449) (0.0470) (0.0442) (0.0454) (0.0478)
Rainfall -0.0044 -0.0016 -0.0022 0.0016 -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age one for all columns. The first main
independent variable “Competition” is defined as 100 minus the share of votes of the presidential election winner
in percentage. The second main independent variable “Rainfall” is defined as rainfall at a DHS cluster level in
logarithm minus its long-term average in logarithm. “Interaction” refers the interaction term between “Com-
petition” and “Rainfall” variables. All sample is restricted to rural areas based on the DHS survey. Control
variables include girl dummy, birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional
trend includes a linear time trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South
Africa. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
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Table 13: Effects of Political Competition and Rainfall on Child Mortality by Age 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Original Estimates
Competition -0.7265*** -0.3894*** -0.2599*** -0.3667*** -0.3505*** -0.2136***
(0.0535) (0.0530) (0.0552) (0.0521) (0.0535) (0.0560)
Rainfall 0.0017 0.0007 -0.0031 0.0084 0.0049 0.0011
(0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072)
Interaction -0.5775*** -0.2907 -0.1719 -0.4172** -0.3612* -0.2059
(0.1977) (0.1947) (0.1953) (0.1948) (0.1943) (0.1948)
Girl -0.0128*** -0.0128*** -0.0127*** -0.0128***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Runoff -0.0114*** -0.0171*** -0.0108*** -0.0169***
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Incumbent -0.0097*** -0.0124*** -0.0081*** -0.0113***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Observations 393,573 387,528 387,528 393,573 387,528 387,528
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Marginal Effects
Competition -0.7204*** -0.3858*** -0.2578*** -0.3623*** -0.3461*** -0.2111***
(0.0535) (0.0530) (0.0552) (0.0521) (0.0534) (0.0560)
Rainfall -0.0156*** -0.0080** -0.0082** -0.0042 -0.0059* -0.0050
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0036)
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age three for all columns. The first
main independent variable “Competition” is defined as 100 minus the share of votes of the presidential election
winner in percentage. The second main independent variable “Rainfall” is defined as rainfall at a DHS cluster
level in logarithm minus its long-term average in logarithm. “Interaction” refers the interaction term between
“Competition” and “Rainfall” variables. All sample is restricted to rural areas based on the DHS survey. Control
variables include girl dummy, birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional
trend includes a linear time trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South
Africa. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
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Table 14: Effects of Political Competition and Rainfall on Child Mortality by Age 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Original Estimates
Competition -0.7927*** -0.4222*** -0.2815*** -0.3955*** -0.3856*** -0.2344***
(0.0557) (0.0545) (0.0567) (0.0538) (0.0551) (0.0576)
Rainfall 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0046 0.0073 0.0035 -0.0009
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073)
Interaction -0.6116*** -0.3042 -0.1629 -0.4211** -0.3593* -0.1792
(0.2012) (0.1979) (0.1983) (0.1980) (0.1976) (0.1980)
Girl -0.0131*** -0.0131*** -0.0130*** -0.0131***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Runoff -0.0105*** -0.0170*** -0.0101*** -0.0170***
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Incumbent -0.0099*** -0.0132*** -0.0084*** -0.0120***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Observations 393,573 387,528 387,528 393,573 387,528 387,528
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Marginal Effects
Competition -0.7863*** -0.4184*** -0.2795*** -0.3911*** -0.3812*** -0.2322***
(0.0557) (0.0545) (0.0567) (0.0538) (0.0551) (0.0576)
Rainfall -0.0173*** -0.0093*** -0.0094*** -0.0054 -0.0072** -0.0062*
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036)
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age five for all columns. The first main
independent variable “Competition” is defined as 100 minus the share of votes of the presidential election winner
in percentage. The second main independent variable “Rainfall” is defined as rainfall at a DHS cluster level in
logarithm minus its long-term average in logarithm. “Interaction” refers the interaction term between “Com-
petition” and “Rainfall” variables. All sample is restricted to rural areas based on the DHS survey. Control
variables include girl dummy, birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional
trend includes a linear time trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South
Africa. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Error Min Max
Self-Employment 0.07 0.26 0 1
Work-From-Home 0.04 0.20 0 1
Work-From-Home and Self-Employment 0.02 0.13 0 1
Work-From-Home not Self-Employment 0.02 0.15 0 1
Self-Employment not Work-From-Home 0.06 0.23 0 1
Hours Worked per Week 27.83 19.03 0 99
Labor Force Participation 0.73 0.45 0 1
High-Speed Broadband (ACS) 0.80 0.40 0 1
Broadband (ACS) 0.94 0.24 0 1
High-Speed Broadband (FCC) 4.24 0.59 1.688 5
High-Speed Broadband Providers 3.17 0.85 1.124 7.476
Surface Topography Index 9.19 6.97 1 21
Age 43.51 10.20 18 59
Age Square 1998.00 865.10 324 3481
Bachelor Share 22.31 11.14 1.396 78.05
No schooling 0.01 0.10 0 1
Nursery School to Grade 4 0.00 0.06 0 1
Grade 5 to 8 0.02 0.14 0 1
Grade 9 to 12, No High School Diploma 0.05 0.21 0 1
High School Diploma 0.22 0.41 0 1
Collge Education, No Bachelor’s Degree 0.31 0.46 0 1
Bachelor’s Degree or Above 0.39 0.49 0 1
White, Not Hispanic 0.71 0.46 0 1
Black/African American, Not Hispanic 0.06 0.23 0 1
American Indian/Alaska Native, Not Hispanic 0.01 0.08 0 1
Asian, Not Hispanic 0.08 0.26 0 1
Other Race, Not Hispanic 0.02 0.13 0 1
Hispanic 0.14 0.35 0 1
Num. of Children 1.26 1.23 0 9
MSA 0.76 0.43 0 1
Notes: The sample includes years 2013-2017. Analytical sample includes 2,351 ACS Public Use Microdata Area





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 1: Construction of Control Variables
Because the main dependent variable patent intensity and drilling well density are
normalized by population and land area respectively, instead of controlling for the actu-
ally population from year 2000 to 2015, I create a population index. Population index is
calculated as yearly population in 2000-2015 divided by year 2000 population. For exam-
ple, commuting zone (CZ) code 100 has 10K population in 2000 and 10.1K population
in 2001. Population index variable for CZ code 100 in 2000 is 1 and 1.01 in 2001.
Demographic control variables are obtained from the American Community Survey
(ACS) via IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2020). I use the year 2000 5% Census data and 2001-
2015 1% ACS data. The smallest identified geographic areas are Public Use Microdata
Area (PUMA). I use PUMA to CZ crosswalk files to aggregate PUMA level variables
to CZ-level (Autor et al., 2019; Autor and Dorn, 2013). Based on the ACS, I generate
percentage share of population age between 18 and 64, percentage share of population
with a bachelor’s degree or above, percentage share of employed population, percentage
share of population in the labor force, and mean adult age as CZ-level demographic
control variables (use notation j to represent each variable in equations below). All the
variables are constructed as predicted shift-share type variables (Bartik, 1991; Goldsmith-
Pinkham et al., 2018).20 Following equation 11, 12, and 13, I conduct steps below to
construct these predicted variables. First, I use year 2000 5% census data to generate
initial value of all demographic variables at CZ-level. Second, I use year 2000 census
along with 2001-2015 ACS data to generate yearly regional (excluding its own state)
growth rate of all variables.21 Finally, I multiply CZ-level initial value generated in the
second step by the national growth rate generated in the third step to form predicted
20First, controlling actual values of these variables may not be ideal since these variables may be outcomes of the
treatment variable which may cause the “bad control variables” issue. Second, PUMA information is not available in
2001-2004 ACS. Using shift-share type controls can tackle this problem. Survey weights are included in the construction
process.
21The four US census regions are the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Following with footnote 10, since PUMA
information is not available in 2001-2004 ACS, I exclude its own state when construct the yearly regional share values. For
example, CZ code 100 is located in Tennessee and belongs to census region South. The yearly regional growth rates of CZ
code 100 is based on census region South values excluding Tennessee values for each year in 2000-2015.
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shift-share type controls.
PredictV aluejc,2001 = ActualV alue
j
c,2000 × (1 +RegionalGrowth
j
c,2001−2000) (11)
PredictV aluejc,2002 = PredictV alue
j
c,2001 × (1 +RegionalGrowth
j
c,2002−2001) (12)
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
PredictV aluejc,2015 = PredictV alue
j
c,2014 × (1 +RegionalGrowth
j
c,2015−2014) (13)
Similar to the ACS demographic shift-share type control variables, I construct a vari-
able for predicted employment outside the mining industry index. First, I use year 2000
QCEW data to calculate the initial level of non-mining industry employment for each
CZ. Second, I use year 2000 - 2015 QCEW data to generate yearly regional (excluding its
own CZ) employment growth rate for non-mining industry employment. Third, I gener-
ate predicted non-mining industry employment for each CZ for year 2000-2015 based on
the initial level in step one and the growth rates in step two. Finally, I divide each years’
predicted non-mining industry employment by year 2000 non-mining industry employ-
ment to form an index. The variation of this predicted index variable comes from the
initial non-mining industry employment in year 2000 and regional growth rate excluding
its own value.
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Table A1: Testing Lagging Well Density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Include Lags Separately
Non-Vertical Well Density -0.0294***
(0.0090)
Non-Vertical Well Density (Yr-1) -0.0258***
(0.0089)
Non-Vertical Well Density (Yr-2) -0.0212**
(0.0092)
Non-Vertical Well Density (Yr-3) -0.0143
(0.0101)
Observations 11,280 11,280 11,280 11,280
Panel B: Include Lags Simultaneously
Non-Vertical Well Density -0.0294*** -0.0317*** -0.0306*** -0.0299***
(0.0090) (0.0114) (0.0095) (0.0092)
Non-Vertical Well Density (Yr-1) 0.0027 -0.0008 0.0000
(0.0111) (0.0078) (0.0073)
Non-Vertical Well Density (Yr-2) 0.0033 -0.0029
(0.0124) (0.0097)
Non-Vertical Well Density (Yr-3) 0.0062
(0.0139)
Observations 11,280 11,280 11,280 11,280
CZ FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
CZ Linear Trend No No No No
Notes: The sample includes years 2000-2015. Analytical sample includes 705 CZs in 48 lower U.S. states excluding
Alaska, Hawaii, and District of Columbia. Dependent variable is patent intensity, calculated as patents per 100K
population. Non-vertical well density is calculated as new non-vertical wells divided by total land area in 1000
square miles for each CZ. 1997-1999 drilling wells data are used for column two to four.Yr-1 refers to one year
lag, Yr-2 refers to two-year lag, and Yr-3 refers to three-year lag. All the control variables in Table 1 are included
in each column except average patent per 100K population 1990-1999 since it is absorbed by CZ fixed effects. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at CZ-level.
87
Table A2: Sensitivity Analysis using Sub-Sample
Panel A (1) (2)
Baseline Exclude Top 1% Wells




Exclude Top 1% Patents Exclude Top 1% Wells & Patents




Exclude NY Exclude CA




Exclude NY & CA Use 2000-2010 Sample
Non-Vertical Well Density -0.0264*** -0.0222***
(0.0070) (0.0084)
Observations 10,800 7,755
Notes: Panel A Column (1) reports baseline two-way fixed model reported in Panel A column (1) of Table 2.
Panel A column (2) excludes top 1 percent CZs with highest non-vertical drilling well density in 2000-2015. Panel
B column (1) excludes top 1 percent CZs with highest patent intensity in 2000-2015. Panel B column (2) excludes
top 1 percent CZs with highest non-vertical drilling wells and top 1 percent CZs with highest patent intensity in
2000-2015. Panel C column (1) excludes all CZs in New York. Panel C Column (2) excludes all CZs in California.
Panel D column (1) excludes all CZs in New York and all CZs in California. Panel D column (2) restricts sample
to year 2000-2010. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at CZ-level.
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Table A3: Testing CZs with MSAs and without MSAs
(1) (2)
Panel A: CZs with Metropolitan Areas
Non-Vertical Well Density -0.0516** -0.0389*
(0.0241) (0.0226)
Observations 4,928 4,928
Panel B: CZs without Metropolitan Areas
Non-Vertical Well Density -0.0234*** -0.0257***
(0.0082) (0.0070)
Observations 6,352 6,352
CZ FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region*Year FE Yes Yes
CZ Linear Trend No Yes
Notes: The sample includes years 2000-2015. Dependent variable is patent intensity, calculated as patents per
100K population. Non-vertical well density is calculated as new non-vertical wells divided by total land area in 1000
square miles for each CZ. All the control variables in Table 1 are included in each column except average patent
per 100K population 1990-1999 since it is absorbed by CZ fixed effects. For Panel A, Analytical sample includes
308 CZs with metropolitan areas in 48 lower U.S. states excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and District of Columbia. For
Panel B, Analytical sample includes 397 CZs without any metropolitan areas in 48 lower U.S. states excluding
Alaska, Hawaii, and District of Columbia. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors
at CZ-level.
Table A4: Using Vertical Drilling Wells as the Main Treatment Variable
(1) (2)
Panel A: Baseline Regressions
Vertical Well Density 0.001 0.0006
(0.0048) (0.0040)
Observations 11,280 11,280
Panel B: Border Contiguity
Vertical Well Density 0.0039 0.001
(0.0048) (0.0042)
Observations 6,688 6,688
CZ FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Region*Year FE Yes Yes
CZ Linear Trend No Yes
Notes: The sample includes years 2000-2015. Dependent variable is patent intensity, calculated as patents per
100K population. In Panel A, analytical sample includes 705 CZs in 48 lower U.S. states excluding Alaska, Hawaii,
and District of Columbia. In Panel B, analytical sample includes 418 CZs in 48 lower U.S. states excluding Alaska,
Hawaii, and District of Columbia based on border contiguity. Vertical well density is calculated as number of new
vertical wells divided by total land area in 1000 square miles for each CZ. All the control variables in Table 1 are
included in each column except average patent per 100K population 1990-1999 since it is absorbed by CZ fixed
effects. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at CZ-level.
89
Table A5: Testing Mechanisms through the Labor Market
(1) (2) (3)
Creative Class Service Class Working Class
Non-Vertical Well Density -0.0029** -0.0049 0.0078***
(0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0029)
Observations 8,460 8,460 8,460
CZ FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Weight Population 2000 Population 2000 Population 2000
ACS 2000 & 05-15 2000 & 05-15 2000 & 05-15
Notes: The sample includes years 2000 and year 2005-2015. Analytical sample includes 705 CZs in 48 lower
U.S. states excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and District of Columbia. Dependent variable is share of the creative class
workers in column (1), share of the service class workers in column (2), and share of the working class workers
in column (3). Non-vertical well density is calculated as new non-vertical wells divided by total land area in
1000 square miles for each CZ. Creative class dummy = 1 if person reports an occupation of computer and
mathematical; architecture and engineering; life, physical and social science; education, training and library; arts,
design, entertainment, sports and media; management; business and financial operations; legal or health care
practitioners and technical; = 0 otherwise. Service class dummy = 1 if person reports an occupation of health
care support; food preparation and food-service related; building and grounds cleaning and maintenance; personal
care and service; sales and related; office and administrative support; community and social services or protective
services; =0 otherwise. Working class dummy = 1 if person reports an occupation of construction and extraction;
installation, maintenance and repair; production or transportation and material moving; =0 otherwise. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at CZ-level.
Table A6: Effects of Political Competition on Child Mortality by Age 3 for Urban Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition -0.3961*** -0.3772*** -0.2711*** -0.3120*** -0.3415*** -0.2552***
(0.0751) (0.0764) (0.0818) (0.0767) (0.0780) (0.0834)
Girl -0.0168*** -0.0167*** -0.0167*** -0.0167***
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Runoff -0.0115** -0.0156*** -0.0092* -0.0141***
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Incumbent -0.0081*** -0.0104*** -0.0064*** -0.0094***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Observations 131,151 128,331 128,331 131,151 128,331 128,331
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age three for all columns. The main
independent variable “Competition” is defined as 100 minus the share of votes of the presidential election winner
in percentage. All sample is restricted to urban areas based on the DHS survey. Control variables include girl
dummy, birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional trend includes a linear
time trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South Africa. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
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Table A7: Effects of Rainfall on Child Mortality by Age 3 for Urban Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rainfall -0.0031 0.0032 0.0042 0.0049 0.0040 0.0070
(0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052)
Girl -0.0168*** -0.0167*** -0.0167*** -0.0167***
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Observations 131,151 128,331 128,331 131,151 128,331 128,331
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age three for all columns. The main
independent variable “Rainfall” is defined as rainfall at a DHS cluster level in logarithm minus its long-term
average in logarithm. All sample is restricted to urban areas based on the DHS survey. Control variables include
girl dummy, birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional trend includes a
linear time trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South Africa. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
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Table A8: Effects of Political Competition and Rainfall on Child Mortality by Age 3 for Urban
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Original Estimates
Competition -0.3985*** -0.3813*** -0.2715*** -0.3225*** -0.3478*** -0.2565***
(0.0755) (0.0766) (0.0819) (0.0772) (0.0783) (0.0835)
Rainfall 0.0056 0.0055 0.0019 0.0098 0.0087 0.0043
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Interaction -0.2237 -0.0217 0.0969 -0.0952 -0.0969 0.1108
(0.3075) (0.3074) (0.3090) (0.3076) (0.3081) (0.3092)
Girl -0.0168*** -0.0167*** -0.0167*** -0.0167***
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Runoff -0.0117** -0.0159*** -0.0094* -0.0144***
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Incumbent -0.0079*** -0.0102*** -0.0062** -0.0091***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Observations 131,151 128,331 128,331 131,151 128,331 128,331
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region trend No No Yes No No Yes
Birth year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Marginal Effects
Competition -0.3931*** -0.3807*** -0.2740*** -0.3202*** -0.3454*** -0.2593***
(0.0753) (0.0766) (0.0819) (0.0771) (0.0784) (0.0836)
Rainfall -0.0013 0.0048 0.0048 0.0069 0.0058 0.0076
(0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0053)
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age three for all columns. The first
main independent variable “Competition” is defined as 100 minus the share of votes of the presidential election
winner in percentage. The second main independent variable “Rainfall” is defined as rainfall at a DHS cluster
level in logarithm minus its long-term average in logarithm. “Interaction” refers the interaction term between
“Competition” and “Rainfall” variables. All sample is restricted to urban areas based on the DHS survey. Control
variables include girl dummy, birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices. Regional
trend includes a linear time trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa, and South
Africa. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
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Table A9: Effects of Political Competition and Rainfall on Child Mortality by Age 3 for Girls’
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Original Estimates
Competition -0.1825** -0.1239 -0.1828** -0.1249
(0.0897) (0.0910) (0.0897) (0.0910)
Rainfall -0.0113** -0.0066 -0.0015 0.0054
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0117) (0.0118)
Interaction -0.3302 -0.4115
(0.3309) (0.3309)
Observations 158,408 158,408 158,408 158,408 158,408 158,408
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes





Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age three for all columns. The first
main independent variable “Competition” is defined as 100 minus the share of votes of the presidential election
winner in percentage. The second main independent variable “Rainfall” is defined as rainfall at a DHS cluster
level in logarithm minus its long-term average in logarithm. “Interaction” refers the interaction term between
“Competition” and “Rainfall” variables. All sample is restricted to rural areas and girls based on the DHS survey.
Control variables include girl dummy, birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices.
Regional trend includes a linear time trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa,
and South Africa. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at DHS cluster level.
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Table A10: Effects of Political Competition and Rainfall on Child Mortality by Age 3 for Boys’
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Original Estimates
Competition -0.2670*** -0.2271** -0.2665*** -0.2271**
(0.0931) (0.0946) (0.0931) (0.0947)
Rainfall -0.0066 -0.0048 -0.0111 -0.0088
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0121) (0.0122)
Interaction 0.1211 0.0959
(0.3237) (0.3250)
Observations 164,543 164,543 164,543 164,543 164,543 164,543
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes





Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy one if a child dies before age three for all columns. The first
main independent variable “Competition” is defined as 100 minus the share of votes of the presidential election
winner in percentage. The second main independent variable “Rainfall” is defined as rainfall at a DHS cluster
level in logarithm minus its long-term average in logarithm. “Interaction” refers the interaction term between
“Competition” and “Rainfall” variables. All sample is restricted to rural areas and boys based on the DHS survey.
Control variables include girl dummy, birth order, runoff dummy, incumbent dummy, and international prices.
Regional trend includes a linear time trend for French speaking regions, Sahel regions, West Africa, East Africa,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A: Non-MSA Sample






Age 0.02437*** 0.02404*** 0.02483***
(0.00096) (0.00095) (0.00095)
Age Square -0.00030*** -0.00029*** -0.00030***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Bachelor Share -0.00086 -0.00081 -0.00088
(0.00073) (0.00073) (0.00073)
Observations 542,932 542,932 542,932
Panel B: MSA Sample






Age 0.01678*** 0.01665*** 0.01728***
(0.00069) (0.00070) (0.00070)
Age Square -0.00020*** -0.00019*** -0.00020***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Bachelor Share -0.00097*** -0.00093*** -0.00100***
(0.00033) (0.00034) (0.00033)
Observations 1,683,016 1,683,016 1,683,016
PUMA FE Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equals one if in the labor force. In column (1), the main treatment
variable is High-Speed Broadband, which is based on “cihispeed” variable in the ACS, which assigns one when
high-speed broadband is under subscription for a household. In column (2), the main treatment variable is
Broadband, which is based on “cinethh” variable in ACS, which assigns one when an individual has access to the
internet. In column (3), the main treatment variable is FCC adoption of high-speed broadband, which is defined
in Table 6. Bachelor share is the share of population with a bachelor degree at PUMA level. Additional controls
not reported in the table include dummies for education levels, dummies for field of study, and dummies for race
groups. All sample is based on married female age between 18 and 59 and reside in non-MSA areas for Panel A,
and MSA areas for Panel B. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at a state
level.
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Panel A: with Children






Age 0.02944*** 0.02919*** 0.02997***
(0.00067) (0.00067) (0.00066)
Age Square -0.00032*** -0.00031*** -0.00032***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Bachelor Share -0.00081* -0.00077* -0.00085*
(0.00043) (0.00043) (0.00043)
Observations 1,436,508 1,436,508 1,436,508
Panel B: without Children






Age 0.02445*** 0.02449*** 0.02439***
(0.00103) (0.00102) (0.00103)
Age Square -0.00034*** -0.00034*** -0.00034***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Bachelor Share -0.00147*** -0.00140*** -0.00150***
(0.00040) (0.00041) (0.00039)
Observations 789,440 789,440 789,440
PUMA FE Yes Yes Yes
Region*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equals one if in the labor force. In column (1), the main treatment
variable is High-Speed Broadband, which is based on “cihispeed” variable in the ACS, which assigns one when
high-speed broadband is under subscription for a household. In column (2), the main treatment variable is
Broadband, which is based on “cinethh” variable in ACS, which assigns one when an individual has access to the
internet. In column (3), the main treatment variable is FCC adoption of high-speed broadband, which is defined
in Table 6. Bachelor share is the share of population with a bachelor degree at PUMA level. Additional controls
not reported in the table include dummies for education levels, dummies for field of study, and dummies for race
groups. All sample is based on married female age between 18 and 59 with children for Panel A, and without
children for Panel B. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on clustered standard errors at a state level.
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Table A16: First Stage Estimates of Table 24 and 25
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 24, Panel A Table 24, Panel B Table 25, Panel A Table 25, Panel B
Broadband Providers
Topography*Year 2014 -0.0414*** -0.0544*** -0.0523*** -0.0509***
(0.0074) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0055)
Topography*Year 2015 -0.0331*** -0.0506*** -0.0479*** -0.0456***
(0.0072) (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0058)
F - Statistics [19.81] [48.89] [44.33] [42.70]
Notes: This table reports first-stage estimates of Table 10 and 11. Year 2016 is in the exclusion group when
construct the IVs. F-statistics is reported in square brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01 based on
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